Word: 9s
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...overstate it. "We have no false sense of euphoria and no jubilant sense of victory," cautioned a White House aide. Yet by its optimistic plan, the White House hopes to reach an agreement by the end of this year that will definitely put some limit on ABMs and SS-9s. After that, who can say? Maybe a triumphant pre-election trip to Moscow to sign a historic disarmament treaty with Brezhnev and Kosygin...
...argument that an ABM-only agreement would squander a bargaining chip. That chip is the U.S.'s Safeguard ABM, now under construction at Air Force bases in North Dakota, Montana and Missouri, which could be useful in getting the Russians to agree on a limit to their SS-9s...
...experts fear that the new Soviet S59 missiles, with accurate multiple warheads, could knock out land-based U.S. ICBMs and give the Russians an advantage. Deployment of the SS-9s has been slowed, but the Nixon paper expresses concern that this may be only a pause while improvements are being made. Meanwhile, the U.S. is installing its own multiple-targeted missiles, but they are said to be too inaccurate and too small for pinpoint destruction of Soviet missile sites and are only retaliatory weapons against cities. Nixon is insisting that the U.S. must continue to protect its own sites with...
...entry vehicles), a system that arms a single rocket with several warheads. Its deployment, undetectable by most monitoring procedures, could make a final agreement impossible. >The Nixon plan provides for parity in delivery systems but not in megatonnage. Because some Soviet rockets are so much larger (some SS-9s pack 25 megatons v. five megatons for Titan 2, the biggest American 1CBM), the Soviets would probably come out with more firepower. Each side, however, would still possess more than enough megatonnage to destroy the other...
Without a test moratorium, the Soviets will probably have three-headed MIRVs ready for their giant SS-9s by 1972. Both sides' land-based missiles would then be vulnerable. In that event. Harvard Professor George Kistiakowsky suggests, the superpowers might agree to abandon land sites altogether in favor of submarine-borne warheads. Then, in order to avoid a new action-reaction cycle that would ultimately render the submarines subject to detection and destruction, Kistiakowsky envisions a ban on further development of antisubmarine warfare. "I know it sounds shocking to say that we must deny ourselves the means of locating...