Word: abm
(lookup in dictionary)
(lookup stats)
Dates: during 1960-1969
Sort By: most recent first
(reverse)
...devastate the American arsenal that the U.S. could not retaliate]. There is no question about that." That statement flew in the face of testimony by Pentagon intelligence experts only a few months before, contending that the Russians were doing no such thing. Laird's assertion drew charges that ABM advocates have altered intelligence estimates and used classified information that helps their case, while downplaying data that damages it. Laird has since modified his March statement; he now says that the Russians are developing S59 missiles with multiple warheads that would give them the capacity for a first strike against...
...vulnerable to Soviet fighters and antiaircraft missiles; many of them probably would not reach their targets. Laird hints at Soviet antisubmarine warfare developments that may seriously threaten the Polaris submarine fleet in a few years. Further, he says that Moscow is developing an advanced ABM that could be more effective than its present Galosh system...
...with extraordinary accuracy and high reliability; they would need to solve the problem of coordinating an attack on our bombers and Minutemen; they would need to deal with our nuclear-armed tactical aircraft; they would need an effective antisubmarine-warfare system; and they would need a widespread ABM system. We find it unlikely that they will achieve any one of these capabilities, much less all of them...
...question about how well the U.S. ABM would work-or if it would work at all-turns on the vulnerability of its radar guidance. Without it, Spartan and Sprint would journey blind. A nuclear blast outside the atmosphere can create radar blackouts lasting critical tens of seconds, as both U.S. and Soviet tests demonstrated in the early 1960s. A "precursor warhead," launched just ahead of a missile attack and detonated as a kind of nuclear smoke screen for the following ICBMs, could black out U.S. perimeter acquisition radar and disrupt the ABM defense...
...below 30 miles, where radar blackout is not a serious problem. Further, the PAR installations are designed to overlap enough for one to take over the functions of another -at least in theory-if the second is blacked out or even physically destroyed by a missile that penetrates the ABM defenses...