Word: afghanization
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...Cost of War; Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978-2009 Oxfam International Nov. 18, 2009 52 pages...
...Karzai government's poor standing among the Afghan people is generally acknowledged as a problem in that not many Afghans are going to be willing to risk their lives to defend it. Karzai is as aware as his people of the limits of control on the ground by NATO forces and the certainty that they'll leave at some point. And so he has been protecting his interests by making deals with some pretty unsavory characters who wield real power on the ground - and that often requires turning a blind eye to corruption and other transgressions. Washington is looking...
President Obama's plain-speaking Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, on Nov. 12 summed up the Administration's Afghan dilemma in a single question: "How do we signal resolve and at the same time signal to the Afghans and the American people that this is not open-ended?" The fact that there's no good answer explains the Administration's hesitation in committing more troops to the fight. Indeed, the objectives cited by Gates may function at cross-purposes...
...simple answer to the Administration's dilemma, in the minds of many in Washington, is to train and equip Afghans to do the job themselves. Obama reportedly rejected all four options offered by his national-security staff on Nov. 11 - ranging from a relatively light increase of some 10,000 troops, mostly for training purposes, to the 40,000 reinforcements requested by McChrystal to wage a counterinsurgency fight - because they failed to make clear how and when responsibility for the war would be transferred to Afghan forces. By doing so, Obama may have pointed to the elephant in the room...
...Afghan National Army (ANA) comprises some 94,000 troops, although even by the official numbers, only half of those are combat-ready. The reality of the recent U.S. and British operations in Helmand province, however, suggests that a lot fewer may be capable of being deployed to fight effectively alongside NATO forces, much less on their own. The desertion rate of troops trained in the ANA stands at 20% - and is reportedly even higher among forces deployed in combat. Afghan field officers are in short supply, and the top echelon of the officer corps is dominated by ethnic Tajiks...