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...attack in context, what we need to understand is that it is not the CIA's standard operating procedure to bring informants into bases, as was done with Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi in Khost. Under more favorable circumstances, the CIA's field officers always prefer to meet with informants one on one and in carefully scouted, out-of-the-way places chosen to protect the anonymity of the informant. But things have to be done differently in Afghanistan, where the CIA has a well-grounded fear that its operatives will be kidnapped or killed - a risk that applies...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: The Khost CIA Bombing: Assessing the Damage in Afghanistan | 1/8/2010 | See Source »

...According to the report, intelligence-community leadership, presumably including top brass Leon Panetta at the CIA, Michael Leiter at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and Dennis Blair at the office of the Director of National Intelligence, "did not increase analytic resources" to address the threat of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), even after it became clear that the group was planning attacks on U.S. targets...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: Flight 253: No Finger-Pointing, Plenty of Blame | 1/8/2010 | See Source »

...suicide bombing that killed seven CIA officers in Khost, Afghanistan, underscores just how difficult a mission the agency - and the U.S. as a whole - faces in the country. Given the size of the CIA, the loss it suffered when a Jordanian assumed to have been an asset penetrating al-Qaeda instead detonated an explosives belt at a gathering of agency personnel, was the equivalent of the Army losing a battalion. It was a major setback for the CIA after eight years at war, not to mention the fact that it coincided with a moment when the Agency is under political...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: The Khost CIA Bombing: Assessing the Damage in Afghanistan | 1/8/2010 | See Source »

...Because insignificant or wrong information can gum up the works, as extremists have unfortunately discovered. "If there's one thing we've learned, it's that al-Qaeda just loves giving false information and bogus clues to send authorities on wild-goose chases," the French official says. "You share what you have, but you're always wondering, 'Is this solid, or will this just become a distraction to someone?'" (See pictures of Osama bin Laden...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: Flight 253: Too Much Intelligence to Blame? | 1/7/2010 | See Source »

...Given al-Qaeda's love of head fakes, the official wonders what percentage of the 550,000 names on the U.S. terrorism watch list might be decoys intended to jam American databases and allow more furtive or budding extremists to get lost in the mass of information. But even if there is a high number of errant names on such lists, he acknowledges, they are a necessary evil - for now. Although the U.S. intelligence systems are imperfect and occasionally get swamped, casting as wide a net as possible is still the best hope for identifying the largest number of would...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: Flight 253: Too Much Intelligence to Blame? | 1/7/2010 | See Source »

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