Word: anbar
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Dates: during 2000-2009
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...While we're at it, an additional 21,500 troops also cannot do anything about the other forces undermining Bush's Iraq, including Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, the Sunni insurgency in Anbar, and Syria. We'd need a surge of 500,000 troops to deal with them...
...this does not mean we cannot use the 21,500 troops. During the next two years, Iraq's breakup will occur with or without us. Baghdad will inexorably fall to the Shi'a. "They get the big bonanza," as one Sunni bitterly put it. Anbar, Ramadi, Fallujah and much of the upper Euphrates Valley are practically a solid Sunni green now. There are still mixed towns and provinces here and there, but it's just a matter of time before their minorities pick up and leave for the security of their...
...tell something was wrong when I appeared in her office at Camp Ramadi early in December. For starters, I looked terrible after a sleepless night that began with a freezing helicopter ride from Baghdad. And I couldn't hide the fear gnawing at me about my time ahead in Anbar Province, where U.S. forces suffer the highest casualty rates in Iraq. Indeed, I saw my first dead U.S. serviceman as I touched down in Ramadi, a shapeless form in a black body bag waiting in the dark to leave on one the Chinook helicopters that had brought me. The image...
...Sittar himself embodies the kind of difficult issues MacFarland and other U.S. commanders face in co-opting tribes in their efforts to wage war in Anbar Province. Until this summer, little distinguished Sittar from dozens of other sheiks in and around Ramadi except his reputation as a ringleader of successful highway bandits. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, Sittar is said to have made a fortune by nabbing cars moving along the unguarded roads of Anbar Province. As the insurgency began to take shape in Anbar Province in 2003, Sittar extended help to al-Qaeda in Iraq, then...
...motives have factored into their decision to take up the cause now, three years into the insurgency. The U.S. is simply glad that the enemy of its enemy is now a friend. MacFarland acknowledges that the reasons Sittar and other tribal leaders have for cooperating with U.S. efforts in Anbar Province remain somewhat murky even to him. But what matters most to MacFarland are the results he's getting from Sittar as the two work together against their common enemy in Ramadi these days...