Word: baldwinism
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Making of an Expert. Before September 1939, Hanson Baldwin had accumulated a solid reputation for sound reporting of naval affairs. Then he included the Army in his field. He wrote books (United We Stand, Strategy for Victory, The Caissons Roll, Admiral Death, What the Citizen Should Know About the Navy). After Dec. 7, he wrote a column of signed comment. His reputation grew...
Last August he set off on a tour of Hawaii, Palmyra, the Fijis, the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, the Solomons. When he returned, he wrote eight analytical reports. By last week, when the Times published the final installment, Hanson Baldwin's stature as a military reporter and critic had enormously increased...
Disaster at Savo. Reporter Baldwin gave the blackest account yet printed of the naval disaster Aug. 9, in which three U.S. cruisers and one Australian cruiser were sunk (TIME, Oct. 19). "The Astoria, Quincy, Vincennes and Canberra . . . were surprised like sitting ducks; none of them had a chance to get off more than a few ineffectual salvos . . . despite the fact that one of our planes [had reported] the approach of the Japanese cruisers the afternoon prior to the night action. . . . They [the U.S. cruisers] had assumed a defensive position, patrolling over a fixed course in narrow waters and awaiting...
...Baldwin's account suggested that the blame for these and other losses did not belong exclusively to Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, the area commander whom the Navy relieved last fortnight. Baldwin named no names, but he implied that inept, overtimid, task-force commanders may have been at least partly to blame. His major conclusion: "The Solomons have clearly shown deficiencies-which stem from overcaution and the defensive complex-that must be remedied. If mistakes continue, we can defeat ourselves...
Airpower at Sea. Fleet-minded Mr. Baldwin found the navy operating long-range, army-type heavy bombers from land bases, using its carrier-based dive-bombers, torpedo planes and scouting planes fully and skillfully, and the Army Air Forces cooperating closely and well at the fighting fronts. But: "We have not yet learned how to integrate the [naval] gun with the bomb and torpedo, how best to use surface ships with planes. . . . Neither the carrier alone nor the heavy bomber alone will win this war. Nor will airpower alone or seapower alone. . . . The lesson of the Pacific war is that...