Word: bremer
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Dates: during 2000-2009
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...indications from Shiite leaders are that Sistani and his supporters will accept interim rule by some version of the IGC, precisely because they envisage its sovereignty and mandate as strictly limited. The primary function of the authority that takes the keys from Bremer on July 1, according to Sistani, is to organize elections by a specified date. It will, in his view, have no business privatizing state industries, doling out oil contracts, concluding treaties or taking any other decisions with long-term consequences. And the Shiite leadership wants the terms of the provisional government's mandate, and a strict timetable...
...convince Shiite leaders that elections can't be held before June 30, for reasons of security and logistics. The U.S. had actually invited the UN in to rule on the election question because Shiite spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, would not take no for an answer from Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator in Baghdad. Indeed, it is a measure of the difficulties facing Bremer that Sistani, by far the most popular and influential leader in Iraq today, has steadfastly refused even to meet with any U.S. officials so as to avoid being seen to bless the occupation. And Sistani...
...Kurdish and Sunni Arab minorities. But Shiite dominance is precisely what the Sunnis are trying to avoid, and some of them are ready to die to avoid it. The Kurds are digging in their heels and demanding to be recognized as a de facto state within a state. Bremer, forced into an increasingly tricky balancing act, had initially hoped that the Ayatollah's objections could be overcome with some tweaking of the caucus plan, but Sistani brought his supporters out into the streets to make clear that it was a recipe for instability. The deadlock prompted Washington to turn...
...special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi concurred with Bremer's argument that the logistics and the perilous security situation prevented elections before June 30. But he also pronounced the caucus proposal dead, as well as affirming that the hand-over date remains a point of consensus among the Iraqis themselves and between them and Washington. He also noted broad agreement among Iraqis for elections at the earliest possible date, which by the UN's assessment would be eight months from...
...Having had the date affirmed but the caucus mechanism nixed, the next best option for an Iraqi provisional government now appears to be an expanded version of the Governing Council. It's far from ideal, however: The reason Bremer had proposed the caucuses in the first place was a recognition that the U.S.-appointed Council enjoyed little legitimacy among Iraqis, and its composition precluded it from making executive decisions - the IGC had failed even to agree on an acting President, instead rotating the position from month to month among nine different individuals, and remains divided over questions such as Kurdish...