Word: deployments
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Dates: during 1970-1979
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...cannot exceed 1,200. And under that ceiling, MlRVed ICBMs are limited to 820. The reason for this stricter limit is that the land-based ICBMs, by combining enormous thrust with deadly accuracy, pose an especially great threat to the U.S.-Soviet balance. Neither side, moreover, can test or deploy an ICBM armed with more than ten MIRVs or a submarine-launched missile with more than 14 MIRVs. To prevent several missiles from being fired from the same launcher, the treaty forbids testing of rapid reloading techniques or the storing of extra missiles near launchers...
...March, Brzezinski chaired a meeting of the Cabinet-level Special Coordination Committee in the windowless Situation Room in the basement of the White House. David Aaron suggested that the U.S. negotiating position include a proposal for an equal limit on the number of MlRVed ICBMS that both sides could deploy, plus a drastic reduction in the number of Soviet heavy missiles already deployed. The plan would have rolled back some Soviet programs and slowed down others, while leaving the American arsenal intact, although it would have been coupled with an offer to sacrifice some American weapons still on the drawing...
...Vance. Hyland produced what became known as "the comprehensive proposal." It would have held Soviet MlRVed ICBMS to 550, a level equal to the number of MlRVed ICBMS on the American side, cut the Soviet heavy force in half, from about 300 to 150, and allowed the U.S. to deploy all forms of cruise missiles with ranges up to 2,500 km (1,550 miles)?a much higher range limit than the Soviets had said they would accept...
SALT fails to limit the qualitative nuclear arms race. It allows both the Soviets and Americans to continue to modernize and replace their current weapons with more powerful ones. Therefore SALT partially funnels strategic competition from quantitative to qualitative grounds. SALT will allow both sides to deploy on new land-based system such as the MX ICBM in the U.S.; it will also allow those systems to be mobile, although the U.S. wrote in the 1972 SALT I agreements that mobile systems would violate the spirit of the negotiations...
...myths point up a number of paradoxes in U.S. military policy. This country has experienced over 30 years of relative peacetime, yet spends more today on preparation for war than during any past era except for the World War II and Vietnam years. We negotiate strategic arms limitations, yet deploy newer, potentially destabilizing nuclear weapons. We negotiate arms limitations in Europe, yet build up U.S. forces in NATO. We state that new precision-guided, highly accurate technologies are "revolutionizing" the battlefield, yet request funding for increasingly vulnerable, cost-ineffective weapon platforms such as aircraft carriers. And the federal government voices...