Word: dobrynins
(lookup in dictionary)
(lookup stats)
Dates: all
Sort By: most recent first
(reverse)
...February the U.S. offered a compromise to break the deadlock. Vance told Dobrynin that the U.S. would agree to ban the testing of multiple-warhead cruise missiles if the Soviets would return to their original acceptance of plus or minus 5% as the permissible change in the size and weight of an existing ICBM...
...particularly policy toward China?in public while emitting no positive signals through the back channel. American officials began to fear that the Kremlin might be fundamentally reassessing whether it wanted to conclude a SALT II treaty with the Carter Administration after all. Then, during the week of Feb. 26, Dobrynin delivered an encouraging message to Vance: the Kremlin would accept a 10% to 12% limit on the downsizing of ICBMs. Vance held out for 5%, but the Soviets were moving in the right direction. The Secretary of State took Dobrynin to see Carter in the Oval Office. The President told...
...final weeks of the negotiations were among the most secretive and suspenseful of the past two years. Vance and Dobrynin were meeting regularly now, sometimes every few days, usually in Vance's hideaway study behind his formal office on the seventh floor of the State Department. On the problem of encryption, the Administration sought to do in writing, in the form of a letter from Carter to Brezhnev, what Vance and Earle had tried to do orally in exchanges with Gromyko and Karpov. The letter set forth the American contention that a repetition of the encryption used...
...again with a second Carter letter to Brezhnev, this time concentrating on a restatement of the general principle that some telemetry is necessary for verification. Largely at the urging of Brown, this second Carter letter was accompanied by a note, which Vance was instructed to give to Dobrynin, reiterating the U.S. position on the two 1978 SS-18 tests. The combination of the letter and the note worked. Dobrynin, at a meeting with Vance in early April, stated that the issue had been "resolved on the basis of these exchanges...
...that same meeting Dobrynin also accepted, once and for all, 5% as the limit on the increase or decrease in the length, diameter, launch weight and throw weight of an existing type of missile (this was a shorter list of parameters than the U.S. had originally sought). Nor could there be a change in the fuel type of an existing rocket, the number of stages, the maximum number of warheads or the minimum weight of individual warheads. These last two provisions were meant to prevent the Soviets from developing an SS-18 with a capacity to launch as many...