Word: fire
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Dates: during 1950-1959
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...position in Asia. On Formosa, Nationalist China's President Chiang Kaishek, old U.S. ally, called his first press conference in three years, added to Dulles' troubles by proclaiming that I) the U.S.'s recent meetings with Red China diplomats in Warsaw to negotiate a cease-fire were "futile," and 2) the U.S., in any event, had "approved" his decision to move strong forces onto Quemoy and the other offshore islands. "Fear," said Chiang, "grows the farther you get from the front-all the way back to the U.S." In a speech to the National Guard Association...
...would probably be primarily under local auspices and local leadership ... It would be hypothetical and problematical as to whether or not it would involve the going back of Chiang as the head of the government." ¶Implied that the U.S. was no longer holding out for a formal cease-fire agreement, would be willing to negotiate Chiang's forces out of Quemoy if the Communists would just stop shooting. ¶Denied Chiang's statement that the U.S. had approved his Quemoy buildup, countered flatly that the U.S. "did not attempt to veto it"-but nonetheless had thought...
Dulles went on to his most provocative statement: "If there were a cease-fire in the area which seemed to be reasonably dependable, I think it would be foolish to keep these large forces on these islands. We thought it was rather foolish to put them there, and, as I say, if there were a ceasefire, it would be our judgment, military judgment, even, that it would not be wise or prudent to keep them there." Was there, then, a possibility of important changes in U.S. policy if there was some "give" on the Communist side? Answered Dulles...
Repairing Slippage. Despite the headline impact of the new emphasis, U.S. policy in the formal sense remained unchanged. The U.S. would continue to resist Communist expansion by force or threat of force at Quemoy. The U.S. would continue to seek to negotiate a dependable cease-fire with the Red Chinese at Warsaw. Given that, the U.S. might seek to persuade Chiang to withdraw sizable Nationalist contingents from Quemoy-but leaving Quemoy in Nationalist hands-as a means of removing what the President calls "a thorn in the side of peace...
...military gain, Communism drew back a step or so. Nikita Khrushchev proclaimed softly that the U.S.S.R. would come to the aid of Red China only in the event of "an attack from without"-i.e., an attack by the U.S. Then Red China ordered a seven-day cease-fire in the Formosa Strait, and Red China's Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai sent a special message to the Nationalists proposing peace talks between Chinese Communists and Chinese Nationalists. While holding out what may or may not be an olive branch, Peng also turned the sword in a new wound...