Word: gromyko
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Dates: during 1980-1989
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Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko has a more recent reason for personal bitterness toward the U.S. As Moscow's chief international spokesman, he took the brunt of worldwide opprobrium after the Soviet Union shot down a Korean airliner late last summer; when he was due in New York for a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, local politicians refused to let him land at the area's commercial airports and Washington told him he would have to fly into a military field. Deeply offended, Gromyko called off the trip. Washington analysts believe he raised his increasingly influential voice in favor...
Great Kremlin Palace. He was flanked by the men of the Politburo's old guard who now wield the most influence behind the scenes: Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, 75, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, 74, and Premier Nikolai Tikhonov, 78. But one measure of the shifting alignment of power in the post-Andropov era was the attention paid to Gorbachev, 53. Ever since Andropov's death, there have been indications that Gorbachev was in effect the country's new No. 2 man. The fact that he should be the one to nominate Chernenko for the presidency seemed...
Only on the smallest issues is progress being made. Shultz met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin in Washington last week, and U.S. Ambassador Arthur Hartman met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Moscow, to discuss possible new consulates in New York City and Kiev and the revival of cultural and scientific exchanges. Plans to open the consulates had been postponed and the exchanges halted in 1980 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Shultz, for one, hopes that these small steps will lead to greater diplomatic leaps. Reagan's political advisers hope that they will dispel the growing perception...
...holding two days of meetings in New York with Gromyko at that time. Inasmuch as sanctions were directed primarily against the Soviet Union-a point that tended to be lost as analysis concentrated on the damage to the British, German and Italian economies-the President's decision was a matter of no small interest to the Soviet Foreign Minister. But at our first session, I did not raise the pipeline with him; though I foresaw the outcome of the NSC meeting, it would have been wrong to tell the Soviets of such an action before telling our allies...
...experience with the White House public relations machinery notwithstanding, I trusted that the decision would not be announced before the flash cables the department would send to our allies had been delivered. But when I returned to the hotel from my meeting with Gromyko, I learned that Clark had already informed the press. Next day, Gromyko angrily suggested that I had either withheld the truth from him or did not speak for the U.S. Government...