Word: gromyko
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...extraordinary thing happened in Moscow a few days later when Vance arrived to negotiate with Gromyko: Semyonov was repudiated by his bosses. Gromyko stuck to the Soviet refusal to include even a limited ban on encryption in SALT. Over lunch, he said in English, "On this question I am like a stone wall." Kornienko said acidly that Semyonov "didn't understand our position." Vance...
When Vance returned to Europe in late December for his ninth meeting with Gromyko on SALT, the suspense was heightened by Carter's surprise announcement less than a week before of the opening of diplomatic relations with China. Now that the famed China card was finally on the table, would the Soviets up the ante in SALT? Brzezinski said absolutely not. Vance and some of his advisers were not so sure...
...first two days of the negotiations were marked by a stiffening of the Soviet position on some minor issues but by major progress on some more important ones. Gromyko dredged up an old complaint: protective shelters for workmen hardening Minuteman silos at Malmstrom made it impossible for Soviet satellites to distinguish the MIRVs from the non-MIRVs, so the U.S.S.R. might have to insist on treating Malmstrom as an American D-and-P after all. Gromyko also raised for the first time with Vance a number of unresolved issues that had previously been considered secondary and had been dealt with...
However, two weeks before Vance met Gromyko in Geneva, the Soviet delegation took a big step backward: the Kremlin would still accept an upper limit of 5%, but now it wanted no limit at all on "downsizing." Gromyko improved slightly on that position, offering to settle for plus 5%, minus 20%. Vance replied that the U.S. would hold firm to a lower limit of 5%. At issue was whether the Soviets would be free to proceed with one or more new, smaller, more fuel-efficient, more accurate ICBMs under the guise that they were merely modified versions of old ICBMs...
...reason for their confidence: on the major unsettled issues, Gromyko seemed to be under instructions to make concessions. The Soviets accepted, once and for all, a freeze on the number of warheads on existing ICBMS at the number already tested, and reaffirmed that the U.S. had the right to put ten warheads...