Word: hanoi
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Dates: during 1970-1979
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...prediction that the bombing was destroying all prospects for negotiation was as common and as false as the accusation that it was a massacre of civilians," writes Kissinger. "Exactly the opposite happened." Indeed, on Dec. 18, the day the bombing resumed, the U.S. proposed to Hanoi that the talks also resume, and Hanoi agreed on Dec. 30. The date was set for Jan. 8, 1973. Says Kissinger: "I was positive we had won our gamble and that the next round of negotiations would succeed...
...forces on the ground. If the equilibrium were maintained, the agreement could have been maintained. We believed Saigon was strong enough to deal with guerrilla war and low-level violations. The implicit threat of our retaliation would be likely to deter massive violations. We had no illusions about Hanoi's long-term goals. Nor did we go through the agony of four years of war and searing negotiations simply to achieve a "decent interval" for our withdrawal. We were determined to enable Saigon to prevail if assaulted. But for the collapse of executive authority as a result of Watergate...
...that he established, with Nixon's encouragement, to bypass the regular bureaucracies. One such channel was set up in Paris to deal secretly with North Vietnamese negotiators. Initially he dealt with Xuan Thuy, Hanoi's chief negotiator at the official plenary peace talks on Avenue Kleber. On one occasion, Xuan Thuy argued that hundreds of thousands of North Vietnamese troops were in South Viet Nam through the "free choice" of the local population. Kissinger found this so absurd that, he writes, "I jokingly invited him to Harvard to teach a seminar on Marxism and Leninism after...
...several levels. Le Duc Tho's large luminous eyes only rarely revealed the fanaticism that had induced him as a boy of 16 to join the anti-French Communist guerrillas. It was our misfortune that his cause should be to break our will and to establish Hanoi's rule over
...forward his unilateral demands. Their essence was for the U.S. to withdraw on a deadline so short that the collapse of Saigon would be inevitable. On the way out we were being asked to dismantle an allied government and establish an alternative whose composition would be prescribed by Hanoi. Any proposition that failed to agree with this he rejected as "not concrete...