Word: honolulu
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Dates: during 1960-1969
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Nevertheless, the imposing array of officialdom at the Honolulu talks signaled that the President intended to conduct a wide-ranging examination of the military, political and psychological conduct of the Viet Nam war-indeed, of U.S. strategy in all Southeast Asia. From Washington came Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle Wheeler, retired Joint Chairman Maxwell Taylor, White House Adviser McGeorge Bundy, Health, Education and Welfare Secretary John Gardner and Agriculture Secretary Orville Freeman. From Saigon came a 28-member South Vietnamese entourage headed by Ky, Chief...
...having trouble getting some key witnesses to the stand. McNamara and Wheeler refused to testify in open hearings, arguing that they might compromise the security of the 200,000 U.S. fighting men in Viet Nam. Maxwell Taylor had to postpone his appearance so that he could fly to Honolulu...
...Good Time." Fulbright insisted solemnly that "we are not trying to put on a circus" with the televised committee hearings. Even if he had been, Johnson's portentous flight to Honolulu would have stolen the spotlight. Naturally, that was not the chief object of the President's meeting with Saigon's leaders. "For some time I have been wanting to see them," said Johnson. "This seems to be a good time to do it." In fact, it seemed long overdue, for no U.S. President in office has ever met with the leaders of South Viet...
Hanoi's rebuff to the President's peace offensive and the tactical failure of the 37-day bombing pause have apparently led the Administration to intensify its determination not "to reward the aggressors." The first point of Tuesday's Declaration of Honolulu states: "We must defeat the Viet Cong and those illegally fighting with them on our soil." On Monday, President Johnson said that "strength is the only language that the Communists understand," and that "it is vitally important to every American family that we stop the Communists in South Vietnam...
Although the Administration devoted a very large portion of the Honolulu conference to this central problem, the success of Premier Ky's rural pacification plans remains doubtful. According to Mohr, "after five years of war, the allies are starting from scratch in this field, and that progress must be slow." The allies will have to destroy the Viet Cong's powerful political organization before they can begin to build a viable political structure, and to date they have never ventured into areas under heavy Communist influence which comprise the largest part of South Vietnam...