Word: icbm
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Dates: during 1980-1989
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...from an Aqua-Lung regulator mimics the burst of a nuclear cloud, over which is set an umbrella; the hole in a frosted ring cake suggests a missile silo; a chillingly winsome little blond muffin sits precociously under a hair dryer, whose gleaming cone evokes the nose of an ICBM...
...deployment of these weapons, begun only last year, is particularly galling to the Reagan Administration, which considers them a violation of the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement. That treaty, which the U.S. never has ratified but has agreed to observe, permits each side to develop only one new ICBM. Washington charges that the SS-25 is the Soviets' second (the first was the SS-X-24), while Moscow counts it as merely an updated version of the aging...
...outright. The 1,500 limit is noteworthy, since the U.S. has a clear edge in air-launched cruise missiles, and the Air Force has plans to buy more than 3,000 of the weapons. Of the 4,500 ballistic-missile charges, only 3,000 would be allowed on ICBMs, with the rest to be deployed at sea. The U.S. considers the big land-based missiles to be the most dangerous because their accurate multiple warheads can be used to launch a devastating first strike. The Soviets currently have a 3-to-1 advantage in ICBM warheads...
...concessions are significant because the Reagan Administration has long feared that the Soviets' land-based forces give them the capacity to launch a pre-emptive attack. The Kremlin's 3-to-1 edge in ICBM warheads--which because of their size, speed and accuracy are called "prompt hard-target killers" or "silo busters"--could conceivably wipe out American land-based missiles in a first strike, making it hard for Washington to retaliate. Though many U.S. submarine- and bomber-based warheads would survive, most of these weapons are too slow or inaccurate to be effective against the Soviets' super-hardened military...
...arms control. Reductions of throw weight would lessen the risk of a dreaded phenomenon known as breakout, the capacity of one side suddenly to increase its offensive force and intimidate the enemy. The issue will become an important factor as the U.S. gradually moves away from a land-based ICBM force made up of multiple-warhead missiles in underground fixed silos (like the Minuteman) and relies more on mobile single-warhead missiles (the proposed Midgetman). Such weapons would be vulnerable to a barrage of enemy warheads, and very high levels of throw weight translate into an increased ability to conduct...