Word: iraqi
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Dates: during 1990-1999
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...anti-Saddam coalition, this plan appeared to be compounded about equally of holes and snares. To begin with, the allies have consistently opposed any formal cease-fire before, or for that matter during, an Iraqi pullout (though they would not attack the withdrawing troops). Saddam, they fear, would use any respite to rest, regroup and resupply his badly battered troops in Kuwait. He might then renege on the withdrawal agreement and resume...
...questions went: Who would be the supposed "neutrals" supervising the pullout? Cuba, Libya, Yemen, perhaps other bitterly anti- Western and pro-Saddam states? Would their presence mean allied forces would be barred from entering Kuwait in the wake of the retreating Iraqis? And what if Saddam invented some pretext to stop or reverse the withdrawal? Having agreed to a cease-fire, would the allies have to go back to the U.N. Security Council for fresh authority to attack the Iraqi troops, a move subject to Soviet or Chinese veto? The common element in all these suspicions is that...
...proposal to lift the embargo while one-third of the Iraqi troops remained in Kuwait was a particularly sore point for Washington and friendly capitals. The coalition has counted on an embargo continuing even after full withdrawal to keep Saddam's aggressive ambitions in check. Otherwise, they worry, he could use a renewed flow of oil revenues to buy weapons to replace those destroyed by American bombers and emerge in a few years a greater menace than ever. Annulment of all U.N. resolutions after withdrawal would relieve Iraq of any pressure to pay reparations for ravishing Kuwait. Whether such reparations...
...Rose Garden, Moscow began backing away from what had seemed to be its own proposals. While Ignatenko's presentation Thursday night had implied that the eight-point plan announced then was a joint Baghdad-Moscow production, Foreign Ministry spokesman Vitali Churkin Friday morning coolly labeled it an Iraqi plan that the Soviets were still discussing and not exactly endorsing. Later on, after the Bush ultimatum, a senior Soviet diplomat said not only that Moscow knew that the allies would reject the eight-point plan but also that "they were right not to accept it." Sergei Grigoriev, deputy spokesman for Gorbachev...
Bush was taking a giant gamble. If the ground offensive stalls, or succeeds only at the price of heavy allied casualties, he could be pilloried around the world and at home for shedding rivers of blood to win the Iraqi withdrawal that Moscow had given him a chance to achieve by diplomacy. But Saddam's prospects were far bleaker. He launched the last-second diplomacy out of desperation that he was about to lose everything in the final allied offensive. Now he is about to suffer that fate anyway, sooner or later and at whatever cost in casualties on both...