Word: israells
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Dates: during 1970-1979
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...Carter Administration inherited this policy from former President Gerald R. Ford. Henry A. Kissinger '50 committed the United States in 1975 to shunning the PLO as part of an effort to encourage warm relations between the U.S. and Israel. While Washington must continue to support Israel's security interests, it cannot continue to ignore the aspirations of the Palestinian people. The U.S. has international responsibilities beyond those of maintaining warm relations with Israel. Prudence, pragmatism, and fairness dictate that we should open a dialogue with...
...refuses to talk with the PLO until it recognizes Israel's right to exist. But we never required that Israel recognize the right of the Palestinians to have a homeland. Moreover, it is absurd to expect the leaders of the PLO to call a surprise press conference and announce their decision that Israel does indeed have a right to exist...
NATIONS DON'T WORK THAT WAY. They are proud; even when they wish to change their posture they hesitate to do so publicly, admitting previous error. The PLO also gets much of its funding from radical Arab states and would only reluctantly break ranks. Finally, acceptance of Israel would be a major concession that PLO leaders want to keep as a trump card in future negotiations...
Leaders of the PLO say privately they are now resigned to accept Israel's existence as a fact of life. For example, PLO head Yasser Arafat told visiting American black leaders last month he supports a U.N. resolution that, in part, "provides for the sovereignty of all states" in the Middle East. This concession reflects the PLO's search for legitimacy and echoes its general shift of direction since 1973 from terrorist tactics to diplomatic channels. Of course, the PLO still includes terrorist elements but they will subside only if moderation and diplomacy prove more effective than terrorism...
That is why, even though a Syrian withdrawal was probable, I pressed for an augmentation of our forces in the Mediterranean. Sept. 23 would be critical. If the Syrian forces did not withdraw-if, for example, they simply dug in-the point of maximum pressure would pass. Israel would either intervene with the attendant consequences or we would be seen to be bluffing. Then the war might start up again-or else the Syrians would maintain a "liberated zone" in Jordan, mortgaging the King's survival. Four more destroyers were therefore authorized to head for the Mediterranean; two attack...