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...hesitant about taking on the Shi'ite militias responsible for the violence, the Iraqi government has shown even less inclination to do so. Shi'ite militias have powerful backing from political parties that dominate the coalition government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. The Mahdi Army is loyal to the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who controls at least 30 seats in the 275-member parliament. "We must not demonize the Mahdi Army or Muqtada," says a senior Coalition official. "He is a legitimate political player...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: Baghdad Journal: Why the U.S. Can't Stop the Killing | 8/21/2006 | See Source »

...other major Shi'ite militia, known as the Badr Organization, is affiliated to SCIRI, the country's single most powerful political party. The head of the Badr Organization, Hadi al-Amiri, also heads the Iraqi parliament's defense and security committee. He portrays the militias as nothing more than neighborhood-watch groups that provide security to citizens, and says American and Iraqi troops "should concentrate all their energies on eliminating [Sunni] insurgents and terrorists...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: Baghdad Journal: Why the U.S. Can't Stop the Killing | 8/21/2006 | See Source »

...That kind of talk enrages Sunnis who face the brunt of the militias' murderous depredations. Adopting the same simplistic approach as their Shi'ite counterparts, Sunni politicians say Baghdad's security problems would disappear if only the U.S. would mount a major offensive operation in Sadr City. "They know the problem, the know the solution," says Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni. "So why aren't they doing something...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: Baghdad Journal: Why the U.S. Can't Stop the Killing | 8/21/2006 | See Source »

...Unable to beard the Shi'ite lion in its den, the U.S. and Iraqi commanders have reverted to the tactics they have periodically employed - with little effect - against Sunni insurgents and terrorists in Baghdad over the past three years: cordoning entire neighborhoods, intensive patrolling, house-to-house searches, surprise raids. But at best, these measures have brought only temporary relief. Militias and insurgents know to disappear when the U.S. military arrives. Past experience shows that once the soldiers move on, the violence returns. After three days of extended curfews and intensive patrolling in Amariyah, a mainly Sunni neighborhood that...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: Baghdad Journal: Why the U.S. Can't Stop the Killing | 8/21/2006 | See Source »

...responsibility for consolidating the "gains" achieved by military operations falls to the Iraqi police - a force that is not only poorly trained and equipped but is also thoroughly infiltrated by militiamen more loyal to their Shi'ite religious leaders than to the Interior Ministry that pays their salaries. U.S. officials concede that several of the national police brigades that operate in Baghdad are led by officers of criminal or sectarian tendencies...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: Baghdad Journal: Why the U.S. Can't Stop the Killing | 8/21/2006 | See Source »

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