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Word: launching (lookup in dictionary) (lookup stats)
Dates: during 1980-1989
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...Mulloy insisted that there was no demonstrable link between temperature and O-ring erosion. He contended that despite NASA's placing the booster seals on the criticality-1 list because of a lack of redundancy, the backup ring would certainly seat in the critical early-ignition phase of the launch and provide a seal even if gases got by the first ring. Since NASA had not established a minimum launch temperature for the boosters, he and Hardy both complained that Thiokol was trying to change the flight criteria on the night before a scheduled mission. Said Mulloy...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: A Serious Deficiency | 3/10/1986 | See Source »

After some two hours of debate, Kilminster, who had supported Thiokol's no- go position, asked for a five-minute recess to consider NASA's objections. The break stretched on for half an hour. Caucusing in Utah, the engineers remained unanimous against the launch. Nonetheless, Mason declared that "we have to make a management decision," then turned to Lund and asked him to 'take off his engineering hat and put on his management hat." In front of the surprised engineers, Mason polled only the management officials, getting Lund, Wiggins and Kilminster to join him in giving NASA a recommendation from...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: A Serious Deficiency | 3/10/1986 | See Source »

When the teleconference resumed and Kilminster announced the startling turnabout, Marshall's shuttle manager Reinartz asked if anyone on the network had any comment on the decision. There was no response. Thiokol was now on record as no longer opposing the launch, and the telephone hookup was ended. Kilminster telefaxed a memo to the Cape and Huntsville formalizing the change...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: A Serious Deficiency | 3/10/1986 | See Source »

Somewhat belatedly, McDonald pleaded with Mulloy to reconsider. "If anything happened to this launch," he said prophetically, "I sure wouldn't want to be the person that had to stand in front of a board of inquiry to explain why I launched...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: A Serious Deficiency | 3/10/1986 | See Source »

Reinartz testified that he had never told Aldrich, his launch-command superior, about the discussion with Thiokol or about that firm's original opposition to the flight. He argued that since the issue had been resolved, there was no need to do so. When Mulloy took the same position, a commissioner, Air Force Major General Donald Kutyna, observed bitingly, "If this was an airplane and I just had a fight with Boeing over whether the wing could fall off, I think I'd tell the pilot." Reinartz explained that he had informed his boss, William Lucas, director of the Marshall...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: A Serious Deficiency | 3/10/1986 | See Source »

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