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...could rely for added protection on the U.S. 4th Infantry Division, which was operating in the surrounding highlands. As part of a redeployment, U.S. infantry forces withdrew from the Ben Het area in April. The responsibility for the base passed to a South Vietnamese commander, Marine Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien of the 24th Special Tactical Zone. In accord with the U.S. policy of continuing to provide fire support for South Vietnamese ground forces, 500 American artillerymen remained dug in at key points in and around Ben Het. The biggest U.S. concentration was at Dak To, ten miles to the east...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: World: The Lesson of Ben Het | 7/11/1969 | See Source »

...early May began to mass two regiments in the area and occasionally to shell Dak To and Ben Het. In the past, the U.S. would have rushed American infantrymen to the aid of the South Vietnamese. This time they did not. In an effort to head off an attack, Lien sent South Vietnamese battalions into craggy mountains around the two bases. At first the South Vietnamese fought well and aggressively. But after a month in the field, they wearied. Unfortunately, the South Vietnamese still seemed incapable of fighting a prolonged and bloody engagement with the more determined and seasoned North...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: World: The Lesson of Ben Het | 7/11/1969 | See Source »

...ensuing siege strained relations between the South Vietnamese and the American battalion at Dak To. As support troops, the U.S. engineers and artillerymen were counting on the South Vietnamese to provide the security force for their base. But Lien refused. As a result, the Americans had to do double duty guarding their own perimeter, leaving the gun crews and work teams overworked and exhausted...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: World: The Lesson of Ben Het | 7/11/1969 | See Source »

...ground access to it. Though ammunition remained plentiful, Ben Het's defenders suffered from a lack of fresh water and hot food. They also suffered from the lack of an on-the-spot commander. Directing the battle from his headquarters at Kontum, 30 miles southeast of Ben Het, Lien rarely flew into the besieged outpost. As a result, he was unable to make the most effective use of the massive U.S. air power and artillery that were put at his disposal. Communications between the various defending units were also poor. Meanwhile, communications to the outside world about...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: World: The Lesson of Ben Het | 7/11/1969 | See Source »

Perhaps in an attempt to counter such bad publicity, Colonel Lien explained his strategy to newsmen in Kontum. In excellent English, the cocky colonel confided that he deliberately used Ben Het as "bait" to lure the North Vietnamese into a position where allied firepower could destroy them. At Ben Het and Dak To, U.S. officers laughed openly at Lien's suggestion. U.S. headquarters in Saigon pointed out that General Creighton Abrams has specifically forbidden ever using allied men as bait...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: World: The Lesson of Ben Het | 7/11/1969 | See Source »

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