Word: limited
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Dates: during 1970-1979
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However, two weeks before Vance met Gromyko in Geneva, the Soviet delegation took a big step backward: the Kremlin would still accept an upper limit of 5%, but now it wanted no limit at all on "downsizing." Gromyko improved slightly on that position, offering to settle for plus 5%, minus 20%. Vance replied that the U.S. would hold firm to a lower limit of 5%. At issue was whether the Soviets would be free to proceed with one or more new, smaller, more fuel-efficient, more accurate ICBMs under the guise that they were merely modified versions of old ICBMs...
...Earle he was under instruction to state that the Kremlin considered the agreed common understanding on encryption adequate to cover any case that might arise, and "no further interpretation was necessary." Nor was there progress on the equally vital issue of downsizing. Karpov held out stubbornly for the 20% limit that the U.S. considered an unacceptable loophole. Meanwhile, Vance and Dobrynin were conducting intensive negotiations in Washington. But the diminutive figure of Deng Xiaoping cast a long, dark shadow over even the "back channel" of SALT...
...American officials began to fear that the Kremlin might be fundamentally reassessing whether it wanted to conclude a SALT II treaty with the Carter Administration after all. Then, during the week of Feb. 26, Dobrynin delivered an encouraging message to Vance: the Kremlin would accept a 10% to 12% limit on the downsizing of ICBMs. Vance held out for 5%, but the Soviets were moving in the right direction. The Secretary of State took Dobrynin to see Carter in the Oval Office. The President told the ambassador that despite disagreements over Indochina, Afghanistan, Iran and other trouble spots...
...that same meeting Dobrynin also accepted, once and for all, 5% as the limit on the increase or decrease in the length, diameter, launch weight and throw weight of an existing type of missile (this was a shorter list of parameters than the U.S. had originally sought). Nor could there be a change in the fuel type of an existing rocket, the number of stages, the maximum number of warheads or the minimum weight of individual warheads. These last two provisions were meant to prevent the Soviets from developing an SS-18 with a capacity to launch as many...
...early March, Brzezinski chaired a meeting of the Cabinet-level Special Coordination Committee in the windowless Situation Room in the basement of the White House. David Aaron suggested that the U.S. negotiating position include a proposal for an equal limit on the number of MlRVed ICBMS that both sides could deploy, plus a drastic reduction in the number of Soviet heavy missiles already deployed. The plan would have rolled back some Soviet programs and slowed down others, while leaving the American arsenal intact, although it would have been coupled with an offer to sacrifice some American weapons still...