Word: luttwak
(lookup in dictionary)
(lookup stats)
Dates: all
Sort By: most recent first
(reverse)
...such potential crises, according to Luttwak, the U.S. may find that it does not "dare to use its nuclear weapons to offset Soviet advantages in conventional forces." As Luttwak imagined the scene, "Moscow could then say to the West, 'Gentlemen, we are superior in ground forces, we can take most of West Germany in 48 hours. You cannot checkmate that by strategic nuclear forces, for you no longer have superiority. Now we want to collect.' " And what will they collect? Luttwak speculated that while they would not actually occupy Western Europe, they would demand that it "show...
...long delays and cost overruns, is just one of them." Observed Hyland: "We no longer seem to know what we want the Navy to do: project power ashore far from the U.S. or keep the sea-lanes open. To do both may be too costly." In rare accord, Luttwak and Blechman emphasized the Navy's diplomatic and political value. Said Blechman: "The Navy makes our power known." Added Luttwak: "It's our only maneuver force...
...Luttwak conceded that extra divisions and new weapons would be helpful. But he suggested that NATO's conventional capability would be boosted more by changing its basically defensive strategy. His proposal: "Instead of responding to a Soviet push into West Germany by trying to contain the invasion all along the line, NATO could countermaneuver and penetrate into East Germany. Because this would guarantee that the enemy would immediately be hit where he is vulnerable, it might deter the attack." Yet this also would probably mean risking some West German territory, at least temporarily. Admitted Goodpaster...
...strategy was part of a broader critique of overall U.S. strategic concepts. Collins, for example, complained that "the No. 1 U.S. national security problem is the lack of creative strategic thinking. Without new strategic conceptualizing, we are not even sure that our defense policymakers are identifying the proper issues." Luttwak went further, speculating that Americans may lack the innate characteristics needed for strategic thinking. He argued: "Ours is not a culture oriented toward the accumulation and rational use of power. We have a kind of Anglo-Saxon, pragmatic penchant for separating problems into small pieces. But the essence of strategy...
Addressing the military aspect of such a strategy, Luttwak suggested "putting some more forces back on the East-West chessboard. We should not do it with pawns such as ground troops but with queens and bishops, like high-technology weapons." Agreeing with this somewhat, Hyland nonetheless wondered whether such a move would be politically feasible. He said that "we Americans do not like long, protracted struggles or conflicts. So we are constantly driven to find some simplistic solutions-SALT, détente and others-to the problem. But there is no easy or quick substitute for being prepared to confront...