Word: mapped
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Dates: during 1950-1959
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...map on this page in TIME'S issue of July 24. That was the end of the third week of war in Korea. U.S. troops were still falling back. Their defense position was breached; on the south bank of the Kum River they were threatened with envelopment from the flanks. It was obvious that they would have to pull out of the salient around Taejon and continue to fight a long delaying action. How far would they have to retreat before they were strong enough to make a comeback against the North Koreans...
TIME'S editors attempted to answer that question with a map (herewith reprinted). It shows the week's combat zone, and the zone that U.S. troops would have to fall back to in order to hold off the enemy. The perimeter of this "Comeback Zone," as it turned out, was almost exactly the same as the line of the beachhead subsequently held by U.S. & U.N. troops. The beachhead covered the maximum area which three or four well-armed U.S. divisions plus regrouped South Korean troops could hold...
...story accompanying the map the editors explained that it looked now like a three-phase war. The first phase was to fight a delaying action toward Pusan and establish a perimeter around this excellent port with both flanks resting on the sea. U.S. & U.N. forces, with control of the air and sea, ought to be able to hold such a protected beachhead indefinitely. The second phase was to build up U.S. strength inside the perimeter. The third phase, as outlined by the editors, was the break out from the Pusan perimeter supported by Allied amphibious attacks behind the North Korean...
...unpleasant answer could be that the Reds . . . might, not want to push us off the map yet; if they wait a few more weeks, we will have brought to Korea the biggest part of our front-line fighting force . . . Then, a real all-out offensive, in which the enemy commits all his reserves, plus up to 200,000 China-trained countrymen, plus his planes . . . could actually wipe out a major part of our trained and equipped ground forces...
Interdiction Fire. The "roof" of the Allied beachhead-the line from the northwest corner to the east coast-had not caved in, but it was sagging. The loss of territory (see map) was disturbing enough; more so was the threat to Kyongju, communications hub of the northeast corner. The enemy got to within four miles of Kyongju. The Reds seized nearly the whole of the Yongchon-Pohang road and brought the Yongchon-Kyongju road under interdiction fire. Since General Walker had no reserves and could spare no front-line troops from any other sector, he was forced to pull...