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...definition no plan for anti-Communism can ever be put in motion unless Communist aggression is halted where it is on the military march. Dulles had good reasons for refusing to state categorically whether the U.S. would or would not defend the Nationalist Chinese islands of Quemoy and Matsu, but his refusal plunged the Nationalists into gloom and considerably dimmed the bright new hopes he had kindled in the rest of Asia...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: National Affairs: Plus & Minus in Asia | 3/14/1955 | See Source »

Trouble on a Limb. Ambiguity is an ancient and necessary tool of diplomacy. In the case of Quemoy and Matsu, which are closer to the China mainland than to Formosa, it provides the U.S. with a flexibility and freedom of action, i.e., the President allows himself the chance to assess the circumstances of attack before opening fire on Communist China. Dulles has a second reason for ambiguity: in Britain, where the defense of Quemoy and Matsu is unpopular, the Churchill government has gone a long way to endorse the U.S. stand on defending Formosa, runs the risk of weakening even...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: National Affairs: Plus & Minus in Asia | 3/14/1955 | See Source »

...support U.S. policy. For example, in the politically sensitive Philippines, President Ramon Magsaysay last month summoned all his prestige to fight through the Philippine Senate a resolution backing the U.S. stand on Formosa. Magsaysay's supporters, erroneously interpreted the U.S. position as insuring defense of Quemoy and Matsu. On this basis Magsaysay and his friends won a smashing victory. Last week, with talk of abandonment of the islands, Magsaysay's opponents missed no chance to say: "We told you so; never trust...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: National Affairs: Plus & Minus in Asia | 3/14/1955 | See Source »

...pressures of those who hold that the United States could and should recapture the China mainland for the Chinese Nationalist Government. But [we] are deeply troubled by Mr. Dulles' speech in which he warned that under certain circumstances the U.S. would employ military force to defend Quemoy and Matsu...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: MATSU-QUEMOY DEFENSE NOT MORALLY JUSTIFIED | 3/14/1955 | See Source »

Dinner Debate. In Bangkok, Eden tackled Dulles over a late dinner. He urged that the U.S. announce, publicly and unilaterally, that it has no interests in Quemoy and Matsu. This would force a Nationalist evacuation, put the wide Formosa Strait between the contestants, effect a de facto ceasefire, and kill the military potential of the Formosa forces. Dulles indicated that if the Reds would talk reasonably, he might be willing to discuss the coastal islands, but that an attack on Formosa would mean war. With that Eden had to be content...

Author: /time Magazine | Title: Foreign News: Voice of Britain | 3/7/1955 | See Source »

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