Word: mightly
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Dates: during 1960-1969
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...True, it might be useful for the U.S. to delay its departure, or make it gradual, even if at the end of two or three years the Saigon government were to fall, because the delay would cushion the blow to U.S. prestige and would give the U.S. time to shore up its positions elsewhere. But that advantage is not worth the cost?in lives, in money, and in domestic discord. Bitterness at home is likely to grow so severe, if the war is continued even at a relatively low level, that the U.S. system itself is likely to be seriously...
...opportunists, would begin to desert the government as soon as the U.S. pullout became imminent. Saigon already contains varying gradations of neutralists and peace factions. Once it was clear that U.S. forces were leaving, they could gather enough support to topple Thieu?and a new government dominated by neutralists might even insist that the American army, which would then be an unwanted presence, speed its departure. Various parties would no doubt make their own private deals with the enemy...
...possible that powerful regional commanders like General Ngo Quang Truong of the ARVN 1st Division might turn into the equivalent of feudal warlords, carving out fiefdoms of their own. The staunchest antiCommunists, like Nguyen Cao Ky, might well fight on, backed primarily by French-trained senior army officers and Catholic refugees from the North. They could perhaps hold out for a time in scattered enclaves. In the end, though, the Communists would almost certainly gobble up the countryside piece by piece and destroy every last area of resistance. They could then reunite the country on their terms, although...
...European allies to see the U.S. humiliated and seriously weakened. There would be troubled questions about whether the U.S. would live up to its contractual defense commitments elsewhere. Many Germans, for example, feel that if the U.S. fails to hold South Viet Nam, as it once promised, it might also fail to come to the rescue of Berlin, as it has also promised. Actually, the fundamental strategic importance of Berlin is much greater, and the U.S. commitment there is a much older one. Nevertheless it was to defend Viet Nam that the U.S. went to war, and if it "bugs...
...Asia, the Russians would undoubtedly use the U.S. pull-out to build up their own position against the Chinese. They would probably try to extend their influence through economic aid and diplomacy rather than by subsidizing further guerrilla wars. On the other hand, Moscow (or some factions in Moscow) might well be encouraged by American withdrawal to probe for other U.S. weaknesses, as it did when it installed the missiles in Cuba. American will could be quickly put to the test in the Middle East, among other trouble spots...