Word: mightly
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Dates: during 1970-1979
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...live with the uncomfortable knowledge that in the overblown Cuban crisis of September 1979, Soviet flexibility rescued the U.S. Government from its own clumsiness. If Vance fails, there is a good chance that a sensible debate on the merits of the SALT treaty, will be impossible. The treaty might well have to be shelved until the silly season of the 1980 elections is over...
...have any illusions about the nature of the new relationship. Peking and Washington were entering a marriage of convenience. Once China becomes strong enough to stand alone, it might discard us. Before then, the Soviet Union might be driven into a genuine relaxation of tensions with us?if it has not first sought to break out of its isolation by a military assault on China. But whatever China's long-term policy, our medium-term interest was to cooperate, and to support its security against foreign pressures...
...nightmare was that Peking might conclude our Government was too unsteady, too harassed, and too insecure to be a useful partner. The massive hemorrhage of state secrets was bound to raise doubts about our reliability and about the stability of our political system. I not only supported Nixon in his opposition to this wholesale theft and unauthorized disclosure; I encouraged him. I was not aware of steps later taken, the sordidness, puerility, and ineffectuality of which eventually led to the downfall of the Nixon Administration. I consider those methods inexcusable, but I continue to believe that the theft and publication...
...extremely uncompromising terms. It left blank pages for our position. It was intransigent on Taiwan. At first I was taken aback. To end a presidential visit with a catalogue of disagreements was extraordinary. But as I reflected further I began to see that the very novelty of the approach might resolve our perplexities. A statement of differences would reassure allies and friends that their interests had been defended. If we could develop some common positions, these would then stand out as the authentic convictions of principled leaders...
...withdraw some of your troops back on your soil; ours do not go abroad." By a process of elimination, the Soviet Union was clearly Mao's principal security concern. Equally important was the elliptical assurance, later repeated by Chou, that removed the nightmare of two Administrations?that China might intervene in Indochina militarily. In foreclosing Chinese military intervention abroad and in the comments on Japan and South Korea, Mao was telling us that Peking would not challenge vital American interests...