Word: mirvs
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...Soviets modified their proposal that U.S. planes armed with cruise missiles be counted against the MIRV quota...
...Soviets have been insisting that SALT II follow the guidelines approved by Moscow's Leonid Brezhnev and President Gerald Ford at their 1974 summit in Vladivostok. These allow each side 2,400 strategic missile launchers, of which 1,320 can be armed with MIRVs-multiple, independently targetable warheads. As clear as these guidelines may have seemed originally, they soon became mired in controversy. The U.S., for instance, has been insisting that the ceilings cover the U.S.S.R.'s new Backfire bomber; the Soviets reject this. In turn, Moscow argues that U.S. aircraft firing cruise missiles-relatively cheap, accurate subsonic...
...Carter package is called--have no more chance of succeeding in the Kremlin now than when they were first proposed. The Russians justifiably condemned Carter's initiative then as one-sided. In seeking to curb the Soviets' efforts to turn their stable of intercontinental ballistic missiles into MIRV's (multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles), the President proposed the restriction of a system that the Russians depend on heavily, and the U.S. does not. Our ace in the whole, after all, would appear to be the new cruise missile...
...York Times can pound it into the public consciousness, as it did last Sunday, that "cruise missiles are not really comparable to MIRV s," but they don't care much for the Times in Moscow--and that's what counts. Unfortunately, approaches along the lines of the Carter proposal, which the Soviets have already rejected, make up about the only arguments that both hawks and doves in the U.S. can agree upon. Or so says Earl C. Ravenal, a former Defense Department policy-maker, in the September issue of The Atlantic Montly. The 1974 Vladivostock accord, he argues, pleased...
...with development of the controversial air-launched cruise missile, a weapon that has been a major cause of the standing impasse at the SALT talks, is likely to make agreement even more difficult. The action is reminiscent, in kind if not in degree, of the American decision to deploy MIRVed warheads during the SALT I negotiations. That decision effectively dashed hopes of significant MIRV restraints in 1972. Finally, additional restraint on strategic development will be necessary even after the establishment of SALT II ceilings on missile deployment, if those ceilings are not to become merely the floor for the next...