Word: montis
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...boss recounted the conversation to TIME, he told Card that he would appreciate "whatever help you can give us." In the formal meetings in Sweden, GE never came up. But on June 15, in Warsaw, Bush said he was "concerned" that the Europeans had rejected the merger. Monti was furious--not with Bush, he told TIME, but with those who had sought the President's help. Three days later Monti said he "deplore[d] attempts to...trigger political intervention." And though the case dragged on for two more weeks, the deal was dying a slow death...
Still, Commissioner Monti wasn't looking for a fight. The Italian economics professor is sufficiently conservative that he was offered the foreign ministry in Silvio Berlusconi's new right-wing Italian government. Moreover, Monti was proud of the working relationship he had forged with his American counterparts; he told TIME he had "profound respect" for the U.S. regulators and described his own agency as a "junior institution." Before Christmas, when GE's competitors called on the case officer assigned to the merger, Enrique Gonzalez-Diaz, to persuade him to start a lengthy "phase two" investigation of the deal, Gonzalez-Diaz...
...Canary Islands, is known as a brilliant mathematician and lawyer, hardworking and intensely ambitious. One source (on the losing side of this case) also calls him "deeply cynical about the motivation of business and a nightmare to deal with." GE's opponents knew they would never convince Monti without first winning over Gonzalez-Diaz. The principals came to a rough division of labor: Rolls-Royce stressed the dangers of allowing GE to "bundle" engines and avionics in packages that other firms couldn't match, and United Technologies concentrated on GE's role as a buyer of planes through GE Capital...
When Welch arrived at Monti's office on June 13, the Commissioner was flanked by seven aides. Monti stiffly read out his conditions. "It wasn't a negotiating session," said a GE lawyer who was present. GE, said Monti, had to sell 19.9% of the leasing arm in such a way that it "would assure nondiscrimination in the purchasing policies of GECAS...
...Monti told TIME that the key point was that GE could not restrict those who would buy the shares. But to some GE advisers, this could mean only one thing--Monti wanted GE to sell part of GECAS to a competitor. That was never going to fly. "It would have been like asking [Ford CEO] Jacques Nasser to drive a Toyota for 20% of the day," says Yale economist Barry Nalebuff, who advised GE. Monti asked Welch to consider the terms and return that afternoon. Welch did, and rejected them. The next day, Welch called Card and flew back...