Word: mx
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Dates: during 1980-1989
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...years, viewers of the TV evening news have been treated to animated illustrations of ways that the Soviets might be able to destroy the MX in its various Rube Goldberg basing schemes, including this latest one. Designers of the various plans have responded that the Soviets could not be sure of knocking out all of the MXs. Therefore the existence of the MX would introduce a cautionary, salutary factor of uncertainty into Soviet calculations. Maybe so. But the same argument can be turned around. There is always some doubt about any new weapons system, especially a nuclear one that cannot...
...never pay off. For another, most members of Congress are sure to howl, "Not in my backyard, thank you!" The skinny Dense Pack basing mode, like the Race Track and the Shell Game and 29 others before it, is an accommodation to the hard fact that any large-scale MX scheme is subject to this double jeopardy. Political objections could, and should, be overcome if the weapon were truly essential to our defense. But in this instance, its military shortcomings magnify its political liabilities...
Reagan also made an arms-control case for the system. By hinting broadly that the MX is to be a bargaining chip in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in Geneva, he implied that the U.S. will cancel the MX program if the U.S.S.R. accepts the proposal for deep reductions in strategic weapons that Reagan unveiled last May. That possibility, however, is at odds with the official Administration position, reiterated privately after the President spoke, that the U.S. needs the densely packed MX in any event. The Administration has proposed a ceiling on ICBM warheads of 2,500 per side...
Reagan made the bargaining-chip argument because he is concerned about securing congressional approval for the system. He hopes to patch together an uneasy alliance in support of the program made up of hawks who want the MX for its own sake and doves who want it so the U.S. can give it away. That ploy may well backfire. By implying that the U.S. might be able to live without the MX in certain circumstances after all, Reagan has produced a self-contradiction that weakens the case for the missile as indispensable, a fact congressional skeptics have quickly pointed...
Observing this current episode as it unfolds, the Soviets must be asking themselves why they need worry about giving up anything in Geneva when the U.S. legislative branch may kill the MX before both sides in the negotiations stop stonewalling and start genuine trading. But even if Congress does approve the MX, and thus makes it a possible bargaining chip, the missile is still a flawed idea...