Word: mx
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Dates: during 1980-1989
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...FORMER ACTOR, President Reagan should have known better. After all, timing is essential in Hollywood, just as it is crucial for successful diplomacy. By announcing a deployment plan for the MX missile so soon after the death of Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev, the President may have ruined the most important scene to be played out in U.S. Soviet relations for years...
...MX decision was a long time coming. Plans had been bandied back and fourth, including one for an underground, mobile system and another--endorsed Monday by Reagan--for a "dense pack" of missiles that will be clustered in "superhardened" silos. So in some form or another, the MX was going to happen. But Reagan would have been much better advised to delay his decision a little longer in light of Soviet overtures to the United States for an improved rapport. Consequently, the MX announcement is the wrong signal to Moscow at the wrong time...
...seem to be no more than rhetorical fluff, should not be underestimated. Kremlinologists say that the Politburo uses Pravda and other papers as a mouthpiece for Soviet policy; the friendly comments put to paper last week represent a positive change--however small--in Soviet foreign policy. Reagan's MX move is sure to put a chill on this new-found warmth...
...missiles] rather than we build more holes." Since Moscow is unlikely to scrap its SS-18's. Reagan would have done much better to aim at finding a mutual compromise. The SS-18 question is on the START negotiations agenda; Reagan could have emphasized that and put off the MX a while longer, at least long enough to see what else Andropov and Co. might do to better relations...
...mobile than America's. In a few years the most threatening of the Soviet rockets will themselves be threatened by the latest U.S. warheads. Some of those are already deployed on Minuteman intercontinental missiles, and others are destined for the Trident II submarine-launched missile and the MX. Even if the MX is defeated by political opposition, the Minuteman and the Trident II programs could still expose the Soviet Union to a mirror image of the "window of vulnerability" that so worries Reagan. That vulnerability will be even more acute for the Soviets, since their submarines and bombers...