Word: mx
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...Carter administration, therefore, should cease development of the MX and direct its efforts instead to obtaining a balanced and stable deterrent through negotiations with the Soviet Union...
...CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S apparent willingness to develop and deploy the mobile MX intercontinental ballistic missile is dangerous and ill-advised. The missile, which is designed to reduce vulnerability of current land-based missiles and give the U.S. so-called "silobusting" capabilities, is extremely expensive, costing from $30-40 billion to develop. Its benefits, however, are dubious, and it poses serious problems for future negotiated arms reductions...
...MX is designed to threaten the residual missile force remaining after a Soviet first strike, thereby deterring the Russians from launching such a strike in the first place. However, since the Soviets could easily neutralize this threat by mobilizing their own land-based missiles, the MX would do little to enhance deterrence. It would be very destabilizing, though. White ostensibly mannufactured for defensive purposes, the MX would bring the U.S. closer to being able to launch a first-strike against the Soviet Union than it has ever been before. Such a move could only be viewed by the Soviets...
...final problem that the MX presents to arms control efforts is one of verification. Hidden underground in unmarked tunnels, MX missiles could not be easily identified or counted by Soviet satellites. Underlying any serious attempt to limit strategic capabilities must be the ability to have independent verification of missile levels. The U.S. should exercise considerable caution when confronting not only the possibility of escalating the arms race, but of foreclosing any future attempts at negotiated reductions...
...MX, then, is simply not worth it--not the costs involved nor the anger posed to prospects for sane solutions to the intractable problems of nuclear escalation. Deploying newer and more deadly weapons in the past has never produced stability but has merely raised existing instability to higher and more costly levels. There is no reason to believe that the MX will be any different. For a negotiated, stable deterrence to endure, our efforts should be directed not at producing greater and more sophisticated weapons, but rather at eliminating the psychology of nuclear one-upmanship...