Word: nam
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Dates: during 1950-1959
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...lacquered table in the Communists' new pagoda at Panmunjom this week, Lieut. General William K. Harrison stonily signed his name to 18 copies of a U.N.-Communist agreement for an armistice in Korea. Across from him, resplendent General Nam II also signed. Twelve hours later, the cease-fire went into effect and the guns were silent...
Promptly at 10, the two chief actors entered. Lieut. General William K. Harrison, the U.N. senior delegate, tieless and without decorations, sat down at a table, methodically began to sign for the U.N. with his own ten-year-old fountain pen. North Korea's starchy little Nam II, sweating profusely in his heavy tunic, his chest displaying a row of gold medals the size of tangerines, took his seat at the other table, signing for the enemy. Each man signed 18 copies of the main truce documents (six each in English, Korean, Chinese), which aides carried back & forth...
...sudden break came after a week of secret sessions, punctuated by delays, recesses and recriminations, and accompanied by bloody warfare (see below). Nam II & Co. asked for, and stayed until they got, U.N. assurances and clarifications about Syngman Rhee's future behavior. Then over Peking radio they broadcast the details of the secret sessions so that they would be on record. The U.N. had been quite explicit...
...Answer Is Yes. Nam asked General Harrison (the U.N. senior delegate) if the South Koreans would cease fire and withdraw from the 2½-mile-wide buffer zone within twelve hours of the signing. Harrison's answer: "The ROK forces will cease fire and withdraw." Would the U.N. Command abide by the armistice even if the ROKs started fighting again? Said Harrison: "The answer is yes." Was there any time limit on the ROK agreement not to wreck the truce? Harrison answered: "There is no time limit to the armistice...
...assurances of South Korean cooperation "will only be accepted at their face value," said Nam II. "If such a policy of connivance of the U.N. Command toward the South Korean government and forces continues, it is possible that the implementation [of the agreement] will continue to be obstructed, before or after the armistice . . . The Korean and Chinese side will . . . have the right to take action against aggression in self-defense...