Word: nams
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Dates: during 1960-1969
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...interest of America's European allies to see the U.S. humiliated and seriously weakened. There would be troubled questions about whether the U.S. would live up to its contractual defense commitments elsewhere. Many Germans, for example, feel that if the U.S. fails to hold South Viet Nam, as it once promised, it might also fail to come to the rescue of Berlin, as it has also promised. Actually, the fundamental strategic importance of Berlin is much greater, and the U.S. commitment there is a much older one. Nevertheless it was to defend Viet Nam that the U.S. went...
China would be relieved that a massive U.S. military presence so close to its borders had retreated, and would doubtless gloat over the defeat of what it likes to call the "paper tiger." Part of the considerable aid that China has been giving to Viet Nam might be shifted to domestic projects or to insurgents who are making trouble for other Asian nations. Possibly, China would heat up the pressure again on Taiwan. But most signs are that China, with all its domestic troubles, would not be likely to indulge in foreign adventures. For the time being at least...
...things considered, an immediate, unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops that would leave South Viet Nam to its fate is an inadequate, emotional solution to a complex and tragic problem. What, then, are the alternatives? The harsh truth is that there are few available to President Nixon. It is still conceivable?but barely?that Hanoi would agree to a ceasefire, followed by a mutual withdrawal of military forces. Any political settlement that would come after this truce, however, would surely require N.L.F. participation in the government of South Viet Nam; that compromise decision would have to be forced upon the Saigon...
...year or two more or less really make a significant difference? Most of the evidence suggests that it would. The speed and style of U.S. withdrawal are more than matters of face-saving. Asia has already accepted the fact that the U.S. cannot hold on to South Viet Nam. But if the U.S. showed its ability to withdraw in a measured way without hasty abandonment of South Viet Nam, Asian nations (and others) should see it as a sign that the U.S. remains a power with a sense of responsibility and constancy...
Gradual withdrawal would occur against Asian perspectives that are by no means all bleak or pointing inevitably to Communism. Much of the rationale for making the stand in Viet Nam was to curb Communist Chinese expansion. Partly because of U.S. resistance, that expansion has been halted. China's influence on the rest of Asia has been decidedly weakened, though this is largely because of the disastrous internal paroxysms of the Cultural Revolution. Devout Communist that he is, North Korea's Kim II Sung takes no orders from China while he is perfectly willing to accept its material aid. There...