Word: numbers
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Dates: during 1970-1979
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...warheads on the MX. Since the U.S. was barred by SALT I from building anything as big and powerful as the SS-18 heavy rocket, it was politically important to the Carter Administration that SALT II allow the U.S. at least to match the SS-18 in number of warheads on the MX. That point would be critical when it came to selling the treaty on Capitol Hill...
...Soviet definitions of cruise missiles were set apart from each other, and from the mutually agreed treaty language, by brackets. Brackets signified disagreement. The Russians had long maintained that range limits on ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles in the protocol and restrictions on the number of air-launched versions per aircraft in the treaty should apply simply to "armed" cruise missiles; there should be no distinction between nuclear-armed cruise missiles and conventionally armed ones. The reason: it was extremely difficult for spy satellites and other "national technical means of verification" to distinguish between nuclear and conventional warheads...
...Director Stansfield Turner took a hard line at a number of meetings of the Special Coordination Committee: SALT II should forbid the Russians to engage in any encryption whatsoever in their ICBM tests. Vance and Warnke felt Turner went too far. After all, they reasoned, SALT entitles the U.S. to some but not all information about Soviet missile tests. For instance, the number of warheads on a rocket and its payload or throw weight would be governed by SALT II, but not the nature of the guidance system. Therefore encryption should be constrained but not banned altogether...
...workmen hardening Minuteman silos at Malmstrom made it impossible for Soviet satellites to distinguish the MIRVs from the non-MIRVs, so the U.S.S.R. might have to insist on treating Malmstrom as an American D-and-P after all. Gromyko also raised for the first time with Vance a number of unresolved issues that had previously been considered secondary and had been dealt with exclusively by the permanent delegations, most notably cruise missiles. The Russians wanted, among other things, a ban on multiple-warhead cruise missiles?an exotic drone that the Pentagon had no intention of deploying during the treaty period...
...reason for their confidence: on the major unsettled issues, Gromyko seemed to be under instructions to make concessions. The Soviets accepted, once and for all, a freeze on the number of warheads on existing ICBMS at the number already tested, and reaffirmed that the U.S. had the right to put ten warheads...