Word: pontiacs
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Dates: during 1990-1999
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...them were the cookie-cutter cars. The idea behind them was to save on manufacturing costs, one of Smith's abiding principles. But the look-alike models blurred the historical marketing distinction GM had carefully cultivated between Chevrolet at the bottom of the market, Cadillac at the top and Pontiac, Oldsmobile and Buick in between. None of the cookie-cutter cars will make it to the Automotive Hall of Fame...
...sheer size, however, is one of GM's greatest burdens. Because of arrogance and inertia, GM has fallen out of touch with its customers. Except for products of GM's Saturn and Pontiac divisions, young drivers increasingly spurn the company's cars for Japanese makes or other U.S. models. The median ages for buyers of GM's bread-and-butter midsize lines are 45 for Chevrolet, 55 for Oldsmobile and 60 for Buick. By contrast, the ages of U.S. buyers of Japanese cars range from 35 to 40. GM has foundered while the more nimble Ford and Chrysler, which...
...early 1960s GM was having trouble building small cars to compete with imports like the Volkswagen Beetle. Chevrolet's ill-fated Corvair, which Ralph Nader judged to be "unsafe at any speed," made few inroads against imports. Yet GM was lulled into complacency by the success of its Pontiac GTO and other trend-setting muscle cars. When buyers flocked to small cars during oil crises in the 1970s, GM's failure to produce a winning model was ominous. "They had become so arrogant and efficient at defining trends that when a fundamental shift took place, they failed to adapt," says...
Perhaps GM's crowning folly during the '80s was the reorganization of its North American operations into two clumsy megagroups. The plan gave responsibility for small cars to GM's Chevrolet, Pontiac and Canadian divisions, and handed large cars to the Buick, Oldsmobile and Cadillac units. While that may have seemed sensible at the time, it created a new level of bureaucracy sandwiched between the automaking divisions and GM's corporate headquarters. The results ranged from mass confusion to a proliferation of look-alike models. "Everything Roger Smith tried failed," says Womack. "The screwball capital investment, the screwball reorganization. Smith...
...their employees, both companies are similarly groaning under the burden of escalating health costs. The changes also set the stage for a battle next year with the U.A.W., which will resist any effort to shift health costs to its members. Says Don Douglas, president of U.A.W. Local 594 in Pontiac, Michigan: "There's no doubt it's going to be a major issue in next year's negotiations...