Word: powerfully
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Dates: during 1990-1999
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...wonder weapons of air power looked futile against primitive "ethnic cleansers" with guns. The long-threatened bombing campaign failed to deter the rape of Kosovo and even appeared to be speeding it. Publicly, NATO insisted that the blame for the refugee flight lay solely with Milosevic, not Western bombs. But privately, officials offered a line that made more sense alongside the awful images. Military planners lamented that bad weather, clever Serb tactics, White House worries about collateral damage--and a reluctance to risk pilots' lives--kept them from hitting at Milosevic as hard as they wished. And diplomats complained that...
...only a beginning. Even though many in NATO were nervous about bombing a European capital, the images of Belgrade buildings on fire was the first p.r. victory for the allies--and it made them hungry for more. As planners unleashed a broader weekend bombing campaign, they still believed air power could keep Milosevic from sweeping the province clean of ethnic Albanians. But as the human tide continued to flood out of Kosovo, the alliance could offer little but grim hope that anything they were doing could stop...
What Washington was not altering either was its basic faith in air power. Even though all the weapons at NATO's disposal seem impotent to halt the Serbs' practically unimpeded rampage in Kosovo, the White House refused to address publicly the question everyone else is asking: Will it now take NATO ground forces to defeat Milosevic? Plenty of American pundits and former U.S. officials urged Clinton to rethink NATO's reliance on air power alone, suggesting that only "boots on the ground" can rescue the faltering campaign. "We're in a war, and we need to allow our military...
...certainly possible that air power may yet subdue Milosevic--or that he will sue for peace once he has emptied Kosovo of ethnic Albanians. By Friday the White House was cheered that NATO strikes were cutting critical fuel supplies. But perhaps it was always unlikely that one could bomb Milosevic into negotiating an acceptable political solution for Kosovo. Now it looks out of the question. The down-the-middle construct of Rambouillet that retained Serbian sovereignty over the province but gave self-rule to the ethnic Albanians for three years seems dead. No one believes the Kosovars can live with...
...Slobodan Milosevic harder? Last week that was the key tactical question for NATO and U.S. war planners. The only measure that matters in air war is how many bombs are delivered on target, and last week's score paled alongside the explosive power that rained down on Saddam Hussein's forces during the Gulf War. NATO's 400 warplanes are launching roughly 100 strikes against Yugoslav targets every day. But foul weather has kept about half those warplanes from releasing their weapons. The resulting 50 effective daily strikes fall dramatically short of the 1,000 launched each day during...