Word: present
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Dates: during 1950-1959
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...official reaction of the United States to the course of recent world events is reminiscent of the advice to an unfortunate, "Cheer up; things could be worse." So he did and they were. At present, any developments in the Formosa crisis offer alternatives which can turn out only bad or worse for U.S. interests. Unfortunately, the Administration has chosen what seems to be the worse path...
...President partially justified his stand by recalling the follies of appeasement and stated that there would be no repeat of Munich in the present crisis. But the coastal islands three miles off the mainland cannot be compared in strategic or moral importance to what in 1938 was the most democratic and strongest free nation in Central Europe. Military experts have testified that Matsu and besieged Quemoy are not important to the defense of Formosa, which lies about 100 miles further east. They possess significant military value only as offensive bridgeheads...
...present Administration which encouraged Chiang to commit about one third of his forces on the coastal islands after Eisenhower decided to "unleash" the Nationalists in 1953; and now the country is told that because the troops are on Quemoy and Matsu, the islands must be defended. Eisenhower and Dulles have let slip Chiang's leash just enough to allow him to drag us into a possible war--one which might spread and which we might face without allies...
...line, however, over two tiny outposts at swimming distance from mainland China is tragically inane. American diplomats should pressure Chiang to withdraw his coastal forces to Formosa and concede to the Communists the use of the now bottled-up Amoy and Foochow harbors, if Mao suspends military activities. At present, though, Chiang's blockading of Amoy and Foochow is an act of war equivalent to the recent Communist counter-blockade of Quemoy...
...explaining to most Americans that recognition of Red China is neither cowardly, immoral, nor an approval of Mao's regime, but rather an advantage in dealing directly with a force the U.S. wishes to curtail in power and size. At this point we can salvage little, but our present policy can very well lose us everything--including our allies and a precarious peace...