Word: quos
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Dates: during 1970-1979
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Even Cyrus Vance, in his attempt to pre-empt his critics, has called the presence of the brigade "a very serious matter" and said that the Administration "will not be satisfied with the status quo." Thus Vance contributed to the misimpression that the Soviet military presence in Cuba has been steadily and ominously growing...
...issue has moved into intensive, private negotiations between Vance and Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin. Vance must persuade the Kremlin to alter the status quo so that the Ad ministration can climb out of its hole - and Frank Church can climb out of an even deeper one. If Vance succeeds, and the Russians agree to tinker with the command structure, deployment and definition of the brigade, then Americans will have to live with the uncomfortable knowledge that in the overblown Cuban crisis of September 1979, Soviet flexibility rescued the U.S. Government from its own clumsiness. If Vance fails, there is a good...
...indirectly we did in Nicaragua, we should either have an idea of what we are going to put in its place, or we should think through the foreign policy consequences if the radical alternative takes over. If there is no moderate alternative and our choice is between the status quo and the radicals, it is a serious question whether the radicals are more in our long-term interest than the status quo...
Carter Administration officials vehemently reject Kissinger's complaint that they overthrew Somoza. The Sandinistas did that themselves. All the U.S. did was to administer a diplomatic coup de grâce in order to end the civil war. To preserve the status quo in Iran or Nicaragua-i.e., keep the Shah or Somoza in power-would probably have required direct military intervention, with G.I.s fighting alongside the Shah's imperial troops and Somoza's national guard. Even then, the Islamic and Sandinista revolutions might well have triumphed, leaving American prestige and strategic interests far more badly...
...large part of the challenge is to distinguish between viable authoritarian regimes and ones that are doomed, especially among those the U.S. relies on to protect regional security. Where is the status quo best sustained, and where is it a lost cause? When should the U.S. stand by a client, despite his internal regime, and when should the U.S. begin to distance itself from him? In the context of statecraft, these questions are neither moralistic nor cynical. They are a matter of differentiating between those with whom the U.S. must live and those who will try to cling...