Word: reykjavik
(lookup in dictionary)
(lookup stats)
Dates: all
Sort By: most recent first
(reverse)
...example, you can test exotic technologies from ground test sites. It doesn't seem to me that with that polyglot collection of advisers you could get fully prepared for the summit. You've got to sort out the views in advance and not have a town-hall debate in Reykjavik...
...Reykjavik summit does not represent a lost opportunity. The puzzle is to try to bridge the gap that clearly exists. This means answering the question, What kind of strategic defense requirements do you agree -- or not agree -- upon? It may not be possible for the Reagan Administration and the Soviet leadership to find a workable agreement, but that doesn't mean it won't be found someday. Eventually, both sides will recognize that it is in their own national interests to close the gap. The message of Reykjavik is that, if you really want arms control, it can be done...
...obvious that this proposal has not been thought through adequately. Prior to the Reykjavik summit, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not asked to study the implications of the President's proposal for a total elimination within ten years of all ballistic missiles, let alone to consider the elimination of all strategic arms. I am relieved that the superpowers did not reach an agreement along these lines. I think we must act immediately to pull our zero-ballistic-missile proposal off the table before the Soviets accept it. A fundamental review of the Administration's position on these matters...
...they thought they had Reagan in a vulnerable position with the elections coming up. They figured him badly. But Reagan never should have put himself in this position. Putting together a deal on intermediate-range forces, followed by a summit, is one thing. But to confront major changes at Reykjavik was a mistake. Still, the idea that we've lost a golden opportunity is nonsense. There's no reason why this can't all be raised again...
...President went more than halfway to meet the Soviets at Reykjavik. The U.S. was prepared to take substantial risks to reach an agreement -- and still the Soviets insisted on their terms. In the final analysis, the Soviets proved that they're not interested in fair and equitable reductions. They're interested only in killing SDI. But SDI is not a bargaining chip. It shouldn't be. I don't believe the Soviets are serious about reducing their nuclear arsenal. We ought to get as heavy a cut in offensive forces as possible. That doesn't preclude us from defending ourselves...