Word: rhee
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Their words contained none of the bitter, carping hostility toward Syngman Rhee that had showed itself in the U.S., and even more in Europe, after Rhee balked at the truce terms. Said Robertson: "The Korean people were not opposed to the armistice because they like to suffer and die. They were opposed to it because of a deep fear that [it is] a Communist trick and device to win by negotiation what they have failed to achieve on the battlefield, a deep fear that the United Nations . . . might sacrifice Korea as Koreans feel they have been sacrificed in the past...
Secretary Dulles asked Robertson what Rhee's attitude was "when you said goodbye to him." Robertson replied that the U.N. command was confident that Rhee "would offer no obstruction" to an armistice. Dulles noted that some Americans "ask if we can trust President Rhee to carry out his assurances." Said Robertson: "There are many in Korea who ask whether the Republic of Korea can trust the U.S. to carry out its assurances. I have no doubt on either score...
...sudden break came after a week of secret sessions, punctuated by delays, recesses and recriminations, and accompanied by bloody warfare (see below). Nam II & Co. asked for, and stayed until they got, U.N. assurances and clarifications about Syngman Rhee's future behavior. Then over Peking radio they broadcast the details of the secret sessions so that they would be on record. The U.N. had been quite explicit...
Back to the Hut. Meanwhile, the Communist truce negotiators came scrambling back to Panmunjom to see what the U.N. had to offer in the way of guarantees. At the first meeting since Rhee liberated the anti-Communist North Koreans last month, the truce hut was stifling hot. The U.N. delegates fanned themselves with memo pads, and mopped their faces with soggy handkerchiefs; the Reds simply sat and sweated in their heavy uniforms. The proceedings were secret. The first session lasted only three minutes, but it was followed by another longer one, and by a third next day. A truce...
...dealing with Rhee, the U.S. strategists and their emissaries had avoided two unwise extremes: 1) trying to remove stubborn old Syngman Rhee by a coup; 2) surrendering to him and going on with the war. They had proceeded on the assumption that Rhee would change his tune when he saw that no amount of guile or obstruction on his part would swerve the U.S. from its goal. Apparently Rhee became convinced...