Word: sadr
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Dates: during 2000-2009
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Since 2004, American soldiers have treaded lightly in southern Iraq, even though all the territory north of Basra has been ostensibly the responsibility of U.S. forces. An uneasy truce prevailed in the area between U.S. forces and the Mahdi Army, the militia headed by Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. Both sides seemed eager to avoid a repeat of the open clashes that erupted in 2004 in Karbala and Najaf, where Sadr's militia holds sway. So U.S. troops generally stayed away...
...decisions on how long to remain in Iraq based on their performance. They know that political and military realities will eventually force the U.S. to leave, and some of the key Iraqi players are using that as an opportunity to best position themselves for the power struggles ahead. Moqtada Sadr is a prime example: His tactical shifts between standing down his forces and alternately confronting the Americans, the Sunnis and his Shi'ite rivals suggest a strategy of boosting his position while husbanding his political and military resources for a post-U.S. power struggle...
...congressional questioning should focus. Will Petraeus propose moving U.S. troops into the restive Shi'ite south? What will he do about Basra, the crucial southern oil port where the British retreat has left slow-motion anarchy, a Shi'ite gang war? What will he do about Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army, the most powerful and popular force in Shi'ite Iraq? The general's own staff is divided on many of these questions. But David Kilcullen, Petraeus' leading counterinsurgency specialist, recently wrote a piece in Small Wars Journal that may reflect the general's current thinking, that...
...This seems to be Bush's preference; it's certainly been the neoconservative line. Crocker, however, isn't so sure. In a recent conversation, he said, "We are getting some feelers from southern tribes who are tired of JAM," referring to the Jaish al-Mahdi, the Sadr militia. But, he continued, "tribal identities are stronger among Sunnis." Shi'ites tend to adhere to larger social structures, like the two prominent family dynasties in Shi'ite Iraq-the Sadrs and the Hakims. "It has a lot to do with Shi'ites' traditional underdog status," he said. Actually, Crocker seems constitutionally averse...
...Sadr's cagey response to the violence underscores that the armed groups battling in Karbala and other Shi'ite areas aren't simply external forces the government must bring under control - they are, in essence, the government. SIIC and the Sadrists dominate Maliki's increasingly tenuous parliamentary majority. And, while the militias had more than enough fighters on hand in Karbala to spark serious violence, the central government had to bring in reinforcements from outside the area to reassert control...