Word: shultz
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...dignified, sometimes even gentle. But its message was scalding. Rarely has a presidential commission so sharply criticized its creator. The 288-page report of the President's Special Review Board on the Iran-contra affair describes an incredibly inattentive Ronald Reagan, a hear-no-evil Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, a devious former CIA Director William Casey, and a Chief of Staff Don Regan whose proclaimed mastery of spin control failed miserably when faced with a matter of substance. And while these officials floundered, Oliver North, with the approval of his boss on the National...
...informed" and made Casey privy to many operational details. Shortly before McFarlane's now notorious trip to Tehran last May with a plane bearing weapons and the expectation that all American hostages would be released, North uncharacteristically suggested to Poindexter that a "quiet" meeting be held with the President, Shultz, Weinberger and Casey to review the plans. Responded Poindexter in a computer memo to North: "I don't want a meeting with RR, Shultz and Weinberger." It was not held...
Interviewed three times by the board, McFarlane stuck firmly to his story that Reagan had personally given him approval by telephone to tell Israel the President supported the sale. McFarlane said he even reminded Reagan that Shultz and Weinberger opposed this move, but the President assured him he would take "all the heat for that." While the report says it cannot "conclusively" resolve the dispute, the board is "persuaded that ((the President)) most likely provided this approval prior to the first shipment by Israel...
...turn, North's flamboyance was offset by a passion for secrecy. From the National Security Agency he obtained top-secret encryption devices to create a secure communications link to the private operators in his contra- supply operation. The report suggests that Poindexter sought to keep Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger -- and sometimes even the President -- in the dark about North's activities. This secrecy was compounded by the lack of any governmental supervision or internal review of the NSC operation. The result, says the commission, was an "unprofessional" program that failed to achieve even...
Though both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense opposed the arms-for-hostages proposal from the start, neither moved forcefully to stop the initiative. "Secretary Shultz specifically requested to be informed only as necessary to perform his job," the commission found. "Secretary Weinberger had access through intelligence to details about the operation. Their obligation was to give the President their full support and continued advice with respect to the program or, if they could not in conscience do that, to so inform the President. Instead, they simply distanced themselves from the program. They protected the record...