Word: sistani
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Dates: during 2003-2003
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...First, there was an apparent change of heart by Grand Ayatullah Ali Hussein al-Sistani, the most powerful Shi'ite in Iraq. Al-Sistani had been insisting on direct election of a new government next spring because he feared that the U.S. proposal - for an indirect process featuring local caucuses throughout the country - might easily be manipulated to favor the nonelected members of Iraq's Governing Council, particularly the Pentagon's perennial favorite former exile, Ahmed Chalabi. According to the Financial Times, al-Sistani is now willing to let the U.N. decide whether direct elections or the American plan would...
...Bush Administration was reluctant to acknowledge these developments for reasons that were understandable and, perhaps, for others that were not. The understandable reluctance had to do with local Iraqi politics. Al-Sistani doesn't want to appear to be negotiating with the U.S.-especially since Wahhabi extremists across the Islamic world are now whispering that there is a secret regional alliance between the Shi'ites and the U.S. Furthermore, the U.S. doesn't want to appear to be letting the Shi'ites set the ground rules - especially since delicate negotiations are under way with prominent Sunni tribal leaders to secure...
First, there was an apparent change of heart by Grand Ayatullah Ali Hussein al-Sistani, the most powerful Shi'ite in Iraq. Al-Sistani had been insisting on direct election of a new government next spring because he feared that the U.S. proposal--for an indirect process featuring local caucuses throughout the country--might easily be manipulated to favor the nonelected members of Iraq's Governing Council, particularly the Pentagon's perennial favorite former exile, Ahmed Chalabi. According to the Financial Times, al-Sistani is now willing to let the U.N. decide whether direct elections or the American plan would...
...Bush Administration was reluctant to acknowledge these developments for reasons that were understandable and, perhaps, for others that were not. The understandable reluctance had to do with local Iraqi politics. Al-Sistani doesn't want to appear to be negotiating with the U.S.--especially since Wahhabi extremists across the Islamic world are now whispering that there is a secret regional alliance between the Shi'ites and the U.S. Furthermore, the U.S. doesn't want to appear to be letting the Shi'ites set the ground rules--especially since delicate negotiations are under way with prominent Sunni tribal leaders to secure...
...Iraq will be anxiously watching the complex political interplay among the Shiites in the coming months. A U.S.-authored political order in Iraq is unlikely to prosper or even survive unless it is wholeheartedly embraced by the Shiites. Which suggests that much now rides on how Grand Ayatollah Sistani chooses to respond to the decision by Bremer and the IGC to proceed without elections...