Word: summiteer
(lookup in dictionary)
(lookup stats)
Dates: during 1980-1989
Sort By: most recent first
(reverse)
...have always thought SDI was a dynamite bargaining chip. There are two things that the summit proved. It proved that SDI is one hell of a bargaining chip, and it proved that Ronald Reagan is indeed a true believer in SDI. I * think the President basically should have traded SDI. But Ronald Reagan has this vision of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. I think the Administration was going to take the p.r. high ground by offering something very radical and dramatic. I don't know how they got snookered into that notion (of complete disarmament); it scares the bejesus...
...Reykjavik summit does not represent a lost opportunity. The puzzle is to try to bridge the gap that clearly exists. This means answering the question, What kind of strategic defense requirements do you agree -- or not agree -- upon? It may not be possible for the Reagan Administration and the Soviet leadership to find a workable agreement, but that doesn't mean it won't be found someday. Eventually, both sides will recognize that it is in their own national interests to close the gap. The message of Reykjavik is that, if you really want arms control, it can be done...
...obvious that this proposal has not been thought through adequately. Prior to the Reykjavik summit, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not asked to study the implications of the President's proposal for a total elimination within ten years of all ballistic missiles, let alone to consider the elimination of all strategic arms. I am relieved that the superpowers did not reach an agreement along these lines. I think we must act immediately to pull our zero-ballistic-missile proposal off the table before the Soviets accept it. A fundamental review of the Administration's position on these matters...
...must test to assemble and retain a top staff. But they thought they had Reagan in a vulnerable position with the elections coming up. They figured him badly. But Reagan never should have put himself in this position. Putting together a deal on intermediate-range forces, followed by a summit, is one thing. But to confront major changes at Reykjavik was a mistake. Still, the idea that we've lost a golden opportunity is nonsense. There's no reason why this can't all be raised again...
...summit was ill prepared, and the U.S. side did not have an opportunity + to weigh the proposals that were being offered. Both sides were contemplating in effect a nuclear-free world after a ten-year transition period. That would mean an abandonment of a deterrent that, in practical terms, has preserved the peace between the superpowers since World War II. Though the thought of eliminating nuclear war has overwhelming appeal, ill-conceived proposals may have the practical consequence of making the world less safe in the long...