Word: summiteers
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Dates: during 1970-1979
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...Thursday, May 4. Connally's eyes were narrowed, squinting, as was his habit when he was gauging his challenge. We explained that the President was determined to resume bombing in the Hanoi-Haiphong area and had decided to preempt Moscow's probable reaction by canceling the summit. Haldeman said that he disagreed with the latter. Connally resoundingly seconded Haldeman. Cancellation would gain us nothing domestically; the accusation of rashness would be added to the usual barrage of criticisms. We should leave the dilemma to the Soviets, whose arms had made it all possible. Anyway, Connally did not think...
Connally stressed that while we should not cancel the summit, we also should not refrain from doing what we thought necessary out of fear of the Soviets' doing so. Whatever measures we took...
...field, supported by his Secretary of Defense, and concentrated on the battle in South Viet Nam. He could have temporized, which is what most leaders do, and then blamed the collapse of South Viet Nam on events running out of control. He could have concentrated on the summit and used it to obscure the failure of his Viet Nam policy. Nixon did none of these. In an election year, he risked his political future on a course most of his Cabinet colleagues questioned...
...every crisis tension builds steadily, sometimes nearly unbearably, until some decisive turning point. The conversation with Dobrynin, if not yet the turning point, deflated the pressure. We knew that the Moscow summit [described in last week's installment in TIME] was still...
...time Nixon and I returned from the May 1972 summit in Moscow, Hanoi's spring offensive had run out of steam. With our bombing and mining making themselves felt, the North Vietnamese army was stalled. Our twin summits, in Peking and Moscow, had undoubtedly engendered a sense of isolation in the North. And they had greatly strengthened Nixon's domestic position, thus removing Hanoi's key weapon of leverage on us. In June we received the first inconclusive hints that Hanoi might be engaged in cease-fire planning. By the middle of September, the evidence was unmistakable...