Word: sunnis
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...ambiguity surrounding the death toll continues to feed into the paranoid nature of Iraqi politics. The most ghastly rumors are routinely believed to be true because so many Sunnis are ready to believe the worst about the Iraqi government and its American backers. Not even government employees are immune to skepticism. ?What 1,300?? said an official in the office of a senior Iraq government minister. ?Yesterday?s (Monday?s) death toll alone was 230.? He elaborated that 230 people-mostly Sunni-were killed Monday in a single Baghdad neighborhood. He spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity...
...Tuesday, following a series of suicide bombings that killed at least 55 people, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad suggested the crisis had passed because Iraq's elected leaders had decided to work together to avoid a civil war. Khalilzad has been working behind the scenes to coax the main Sunni parliamentary parties back to the negotiating table and to tamp down the belligerence of Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the largest party in the Shi'ite alliance...
...Despite waging two insurrections against U.S. forces and antagonizing some more powerful Shi'ite leaders, Sadr has emerged not only as the kingmaker within the dominant Shi'ite parliamentary alliance, but also as potentially the most important bridge between Shi'ite and Sunni militants. The events of the past week saw him take a major role in the parliament of the streets which rapidly eclipsed the tortuous negotiations of elected legislators: Sadr's followers are reported to have been in the forefront of attacks on Sunnis in the 24 hours that followed the Samarra bombing, while their leader was away...
...Sadr immediately demanded restraint, and sent representatives to huddle with leaders of the Association of Muslim Scholars, a Sunni clerical body with ties to the insurgency. That move, and talk of joint action to protect holy places, underlined Sadr's ability to reach out to at least some Sunnis-not least because of nationalist credentials built by his confrontations with U.S. forces, and also by his firm rejection of the SCIRI proposal for a southern Shi'ite mini-state...
...essence, Sadr appears to be betting that Shi'ite and Sunni Iraqis mistrust the U.S. more than they mistrust each other, a not unreasonable assumption. Indeed, both Shi'ites and Sunnis on the streets tend to blame the U.S. presence for the mounting sectarian discord; opinion polls have long found a majority of Iraqis wanting Coalition forces to leave. The parties of the dominant Shi'ite alliance are formally committed to a similar position, although in reality they're in no hurry to face the security consequences of a hasty U.S. departure. Still, Sadr's game plan may include championing...