Word: talbott
(lookup in dictionary)
(lookup stats)
Dates: during 1970-1979
Sort By: most recent first
(reverse)
That is the concern of former Secretary of Defense (and more recently, of Energy) James Schlesinger. In an interview last week with TIME Diplomatic Correspondent Strobe Talbott, Schlesinger described the fall of the Shah last January and the rise of Khomeini as "a cataclysm for American foreign policy?the first serious revolution since 1917 in terms of world impact." Said Schlesinger: "It is plain that respect for the U.S. would be higher if we didn't just fumble around continuously and weren't half-apologetic about whatever we do. An image of weakness is going to elicit this kind...
...Strobe Talbott's cynical Essay on "The Dilemma of Dealing with Dictators" [Sept. 24] clearly shows why we are so hated among the Third World nations. Talbott spends all his time telling us which despots we should back and which we should discard, according to our best interests. When a tyrant is no longer useful to us, we should invoke human rights. Only in the last two lines of his Essay does Talbott remember that the people in the distressed countries should have something to say about their own destiny...
...Talbott's insistence on favoring anecdote over content isn't enough to spoil the flow of the book, his other tendecies are sure to detain any reader. Talbott's penchant for acronyms rivals that of the most accomplished New Deal administrator. When he introduces them for important terms to which he repeatedly refers--ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missles), MIRVs (Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles) and MRVs (Multiple Re-entry Vehicles)--its understandable and helps the reader along. But when he talks about SNLVs (Strategic Nuclear Launch Vehicles), CBMs (Confidence Building Measures) and FRODs (Functionally Related Observable Differences), he sounds like just...
...however, because Talbott does include some perceptive analysis. Although his approach, as one might expect, concentrates too heavily on the American side of the negotiating process, he successfully relates the intricacies of the Washington side of the table. He describes how President Carter's diplomatic naivete and moralistic approach to an essentially amoral process combined to sink many of his initiatives. He dissects the American team's frustrations, while underscoring Carter's desire "to do more than just dot the i's and cross the t's on a document that would be widely perceived as Henry Kissinger's handiwork...
...insightful observations, however, are too often lost among an arsenal of anecdotes. When Talbott starts repeating identical quotations in different parts of the book, you know his once-sharp memory is dulling or he's simply not paying attention. Members of the Carter administration may enjoy this book, for nothing except its failure to clearly isolate and identify its diplomatic team's failures. But at seven cents a page, those of us who may never push the buttons might as well invest in fallout shelters instead...