Word: thiokol
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Mulloy and Hardy led the NASA challenge to this conclusion. Hardy said that he was "appalled" by the reasoning behind the no-fly stance of Thiokol, $ while Mulloy insisted that there was no demonstrable link between temperature and O-ring erosion. He contended that despite NASA's placing the booster seals on the criticality-1 list because of a lack of redundancy, the backup ring would certainly seat in the critical early-ignition phase of the launch and provide a seal even if gases got by the first ring. Since NASA had not established a minimum launch temperature...
After some two hours of debate, Kilminster, who had supported Thiokol's no- go position, asked for a five-minute recess to consider NASA's objections. The break stretched on for half an hour. Caucusing in Utah, the engineers remained unanimous against the launch. Nonetheless, Mason declared that "we have to make a management decision," then turned to Lund and asked him to 'take off his engineering hat and put on his management hat." In front of the surprised engineers, Mason polled only the management officials, getting Lund, Wiggins and Kilminster to join him in giving NASA a recommendation from...
When the teleconference resumed and Kilminster announced the startling turnabout, Marshall's shuttle manager Reinartz asked if anyone on the network had any comment on the decision. There was no response. Thiokol was now on record as no longer opposing the launch, and the telephone hookup was ended. Kilminster telefaxed a memo to the Cape and Huntsville formalizing the change...
Understandably, the Rogers commission wanted to know what had caused the switch at Thiokol. Testified Lund: "We got ourselves into the thought process that we were trying to find some way to prove to them it (the booster) wouldn't work. We couldn't prove absolutely that it wouldn't work." When Mason was asked whether telling Lund to put on his management hat did not amount to pressuring his subordinate to change his mind, he replied, "Well, I hope not, but it could be interpreted that way." Both Hardy and Mulloy insisted that they had exerted no pressure...
Reinartz testified that he had never told Aldrich, his launch-command superior, about the discussion with Thiokol or about that firm's original opposition to the flight. He argued that since the issue had been resolved, there was no need to do so. When Mulloy took the same position, a commissioner, Air Force Major General Donald Kutyna, observed bitingly, "If this was an airplane and I just had a fight with Boeing over whether the wing could fall off, I think I'd tell the pilot." Reinartz explained that he had informed his boss, William Lucas, director of the Marshall...