Word: timoshenkos
(lookup in dictionary)
(lookup stats)
Dates: during 1940-1949
Sort By: most recent first
(reverse)
...Timoshenko's Choice. Moscow this week confirmed Berlin's major claims: at some points the Germans had advanced 85 and 100 miles and more to the Don itself; German columns were converging toward the key city of Voronezh, just east of the Don, and midway between Moscow and Rostov on the all-important railway to the Caucasus...
Caught between these columns were great and now partially isolated segments of Marshal Semion Timoshenko's armies. A grave effect of the German strategy was to confront Timoshenko with several simultaneous Nazi fronts, further draining his limited totals of men and weapons, giving him the difficult choice of retreat or encirclement. He chose to retreat...
...main blow fell south of Moscow, their summer strategy, as it unfolded, embraced the whole Russian front. Near Borodino, where Napoleon won a Pyrrhic victory, Nazi artillery and infantry made just enough of a gesture to pin down the Red forces defending the capital to keep them from relieving Timoshenko. Then, on the Kalinin front northwest of Moscow, the Germans began still another drive. It was geared for speed: fleets of Luftwaffe transports swarmed into rear-line fields to supply the mobile Nazi forces. This served immediately to divert the Red Army from the crucial south; it was also...
...Near Kharkov, 400 miles to the north, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's tight teams of planes, tanks, guns and men punched a dent, then tried to hack a great pocket in Marshal Semion Timoshenko's defenses. Eventually, if the Nazi plan worked, the pocket would become an ever-enlarging fissure...
...these related actions constituted a concerted effort to gnaw through the successive layers of Russia's front-wide defense-in-depth. For the Russians, the most disturbing sign was Timoshenko's seeming lack of enough equipment to turn the German tactics near Kharkov to his advantage. Given ample arms, he was in ideal position to smash Bock's advancing forces by simultaneous attack from all sides of the pocket. Perhaps Moscow was holding its fire for a larger crisis at Kursk; perhaps Timoshenko preferred to wait until the Kharkov pocket was deeper, the Germans more vulnerable...