Word: two
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Dates: during 1970-1979
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Inside the two-story brick chancellery building, known to Americans as "Fort Apache" for its special security reinforcements, Marine guards donned flak jackets and gas masks and ordered everyone to the top floor. There, in the ambassador's office, Political Officer Victor Tomseth was on the phone to the embassy's ranking officer, Charge d'Affaires L. Bruce Laingen, who was at the Foreign Ministry. Other embassy officers quickly telephoned other Iranian officials, trying to get help. Just before 1 p.m., Laingen gave Tomseth the order: "Final destruction." Immediately, embassy officers grabbed files from safes and began shredding and burning...
Late in the week the student occupiers of the embassy released the contents of two highly sensitive documents that embassy personnel had apparently not had time to destroy. Both seemed to show that the Administration, at least as of last summer, had been considering "the inevitable step" of allowing the Shah to enter the U.S. The first cable, which was sent by Henry Precht, director of the State Department's Office of Iranian Affairs to Laingen in Tehran on Aug. 2, proposed that sometime before January 1980 the U.S. should inform the Iranian government of the "intense pressures...
...surface, at least, the documents appeared to confirm the students' fears that Washington was secretly plotting to let the Shah gain sanctuary in the U.S. State Department officials insisted that the cables had been released out of context, and were only two of many informal messages about the problem of the Shah that went back and forth between the embassy and Washington. Last week the White House acknowledged that there had indeed been much correspondence mulling over U.S. policy toward the Shah's sanctuary problem. A top Administration official further conceded to TIME that "Henry Kissinger, [Chase Manhattan Bank Chairman...
...select Clark and Miller to fly to Tehran and negotiate with the Ayatullah. Clark had been an early U.S. supporter of Khomeini and had visited him last January in France; Miller was a former Foreign Service officer in Iran who had opposed Administration policy toward the Shah. The two men had already left for Iran when Khomeini announced that he would not meet with them. The White House told them to remain in Istanbul until the situation became clearer...
Then came a surprising development: an apparent offer by the P.L.O. to try to negotiate for the hostages' lives. P.L.O. Chief Yasser Arafat sent two emissaries, including a close military adviser, Saed Say el (also known as Abu Walid), to Tehran. The State Department said that it welcomed assistance and recalled that the P.L.O. had helped arrange the evacuation of several hundred Americans from Beirut in 1976 during the Lebanese civil war. The Administration was reluctant to depart from U.S. policy toward the P.L.O., namely, that it will not recognize or negotiate with the organization until it acknowledges Israel...